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INTRODUCTION
Boundary disputes are often bitter, contentious, and can boil over
into armed conflict.' This is especially the case in Africa where, at
the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885, colonial powers carved out
boundaries without regard for inhabitants and local geography.2 Fear
1. See Jan Paulsson, Boundary Disputes into the Twenty-First Century: Why,
How... and Who? 95 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROCEEDINGS 122, 122 (2001)
(observing the tensions that exist between states with boundary disputes).
2. See P. Mweti Munya, The International Court of Justice and Peaceful
Settlement of African Disputes: Problems, Challenges, and Prospects, 7 J. INT'L L.
& PRACTICE 159, 165 (1998) (noting that the Conference created countries without
consideration for preexisting geographic, ethnic, or cultural affinities); see also
Keith Somerville, Border Dispute an African Colonial Legacy, BBC, Oct. 10, 2002
(remarking that lack of precision and scant documentation between colonial
powers has led to numerous border conflicts in post-colonial Africa),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2316645.stm (last visited Jan. 14, 2004). See
generally Ronald Robinson, The Conference in Berlin and the Future in Africa,
1884-1885, in BISMARCK, EUROPE AND AFRICA: THE BERLIN CONFERENCE 1884-
1885 AND THE ONSET OF PARTITION OF AFRICA, 1, 30-32(Stig Forster et al. eds.,
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of ethnic fragmentation in post-colonial Africa led countries to sign
the 1964 Organization of African Unity ("OAU") Cairo Declaration
on Border Disputes Among African States.3
In spite of the Cairo Declaration, African countries continue to call
upon international judicial bodies to mediate present day border
disputes.4 Although some African countries have consented to border
rulings by international judicial bodies,5 other African countries have
refused to comply with unfavorable rulings.6 Most recently, Nigeria
greeted the International Court of Justice's ("ICJ" or "Court") ruling
that the Bakassi Peninsula belonged to Cameroon with anger and
contempt, and has yet to turn the Bakassi Peninsula over to
Cameroon.' Similarly, Ethiopia expressed its disappointment at a
ruling by the Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission ("EEBC") over
1988) (describing the events and repercussions of the Berlin Conference, where
European powers and the United States met to divide Africa amongst themselves).
3. See Resolutions Adopted by the First Ordinary Session of the Assembly of
Heads of State and Government Held in Cairo, UAR, From 17 to 21 July 1964:
Border Disputes Among African States, OAU Doc. AHG/Res. 16(I) (1964)
[hereinafter Cairo Declaration] (committing African states to respect the borders
existing on their achievement of national independence), http://www.africa-
union.org/officialdocuments/Heads%20oP/2OState%20Summits/hog/bHoGAsse
mbly1964.pdf. (last visited Jan. 14, 2004); see also Makau Wa Mutua, Why
Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry, 16 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1113,
1162-64 (1995) (noting that African countries adopted the Cairo Declaration in
order to avoid the fragmentation of countries on the basis of ethnicity).
4. See Munya, supra note 2, at 173-183 (arguing that factors such as the end
of the Cold War, structural changes in the ICJ, and a change in judicial attitude has
led more African countries to bring disputes before the ICJ). These changes have
led the ICJ to decide more African border disputes by relying on the assumption
that colonial boundaries already in existence should be preserved to decrease
potential future conflicts. Id. at 215-218. The ICJ has already faced these issues in
cases between Burkina Faso and Mali, Libya and Chad, Botswana and Namibia,
and between Nigeria and Cameroon. Id.
5. See id. at 220-21 (discussing two cases in which African countries
complied with decisions by the ICJ on territorial issues).
6. See Martin Plaut, Nigeria Opens Legal Can of Worms, BBC, Oct. 24, 2002
(discussing legal repercussions of Nigeria's rejection of an ICJ ruling as potentially
challenging the U.N.), at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/23569231933451.stm
(last visited Jan. 14, 2004).
7. See id. (reporting on Nigeria's rejection of the decision by the ICJ).
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its border dispute with Eritrea.8 Ethiopia's protest against the EEBC
decision has forced the EEBC to indefinitely postpone the
demarcation of the Ethio-Eritrean border.9 The demarcation was
originally scheduled in May 2003 and then postponed to October
2003.10
These two cases expose the weaknesses in international judicial
bodies' ability to compel countries to submit to their binding and
final decisions.1 In both cases, a dispute over a symbolic strip of
land along an ill-defined border sparked armed conflict.1 2 Moreover,
a substantial number of the people living in the disputed land
consider themselves nationals of the country that obtained the
unfavorable ruling. 3 However, the two cases proceeded in different
8. See Damian Zane, Ethiopia Regrets Badme Ruling, BBC, Apr. 3, 2003
(noting that while the Ethiopian government expressed disappointment at the
ruling, but did not openly reject it), at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2914559.stm (last visited Jan. 14, 2004).
9. See Eritrea-Ethiopia: Border Demarcation Again Postponed, IRIN
NEWS.ORG, Oct. 24, 2003 (explaining that the U.N. Mission in Ethiopia and
Eritrea has postponed the demarcation and not provided a new date for the
demarcation), at
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportlD=37429&SelectRegion=Hornof Afr
ica&SelectCountry=ERITREA-ETHIOPIA (last visited Jan. 14, 2004).
10. Id.
11. See discussion infra Part II.A (identifying weaknesses that enable countries
to disregard supposedly binding and final decisions).
12. Compare Nita Bhalla, Badme: Village in No Man's Land, BBC, Apr. 22,
2002 (explaining how the Ethio-Eritrean border war began in a fight over Badme),
at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1943527.stm (last visited Aug. 10, 2003), with
Gilbert M. Khadiagala, Reflections on the Ethiopia-Eritrea Border Conflict, 23
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 39, 42-43 (1999) (arguing that ideological and
personality conflicts between the leaders of Ethiopia and Eritrea and different
approaches to political management, economic relations, and nation-building led to
the border war).
13. See Omer Songwe, Nigerians in Fear in Bakassi, BBC, Nov. 1, 2002
(reporting that the majority of people living in the disputed Bakassi, a peninsula in
the southern border between Nigeria and Cameroon, are Nigerian fishermen), at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2387993.stm (last visited Jan. 14, 2004); see also
Bhalla, supra note 12 (observing that most of the 5,000 residents of Badme say
they are from Ethipia). Badme is a small town in the northwestern border of
Ethiopia and Eritrea. Id.
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forums: the ICJ heard Cameroon's case against Nigeria,14 and an
arbitration court, the EEBC, adjudicated Ethiopia's dispute with
Eritrea. 5
This comment analyzes the differences between the ICJ and the
EEBC, and points out weaknesses in the ICJ's and EEBC's ability to
bind countries to their decisions. 6 Part I provides the background for
the border disputes and explains how these cases appeared before
their respective international bodies.1 7 Part I also stresses the
similarities and differences between the ICJ and EEBC, and briefly
summarizes the rationale of each court.18 Examining these rulings in
light of Ethiopia's and Nigeria's objections, Part II points out why
countries refuse to comply with such decisions.19 Part II also argues
14. See Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon
and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nig.), 2002 I.C.J. 94 (Oct. 10) (ruling on the border
between Nigeria and Cameroon),
http://212.153.43.18/icjwww/idocket/icn/icnjudgment/icn-ijudgment_2002 1010.P
DF (last visited Jan. 14, 2004).
15. See Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission: Decision Regarding
Delimitation of the Border Between the State of Eritrea and the Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (Eri. v. Eth.), 41 I.L.M. 1057, (Apr. 13, 2002)
[hereinafter Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission] (laying out the court's
decision on the boundary between Ethiopia and Eritrea),
http://www.un.org/NewsLinks/eebcarbitration/EEBC-Decision.pdf (last visited
Jan. 15, 2004). The EEBC was created under auspices of the Permanent Court of
Arbitration ("PCA"). See Agreement Between the Government of the Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of the State of Eritrea, Eth.-
Eri, Dec. 12, 2000, 40 I.L.M. 260 art. 4(11) [hereinafter Algiers Agreement]
(basing the EEBC's rules on the 1992 Permanent Court of Arbitration Optional Rules
for Arbitrating Disputes Between Two States), http://www.pca-
cpa.org/ENGLISH/RPC/E-E%2OAgreement.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2004).
16. See discussion infra Part II (discussing weaknesses that limit international
courts' ability to bind parties).
17. See infra Part I.A. 1 (explaining background of the Eritrea-Ethiopia border
dispute and how the case came before the EEBC); see also infra Part I.A.2
(providing background to the Nigeria-Cameroon border dispute and how the case
came before the ICJ).
18. See infra Part I.B. I (summarizing comparing the similarities and
differences between the ICJ and P.C.A., and exploring the common problem in the
courts' inability to enforce binding decisions); see also infra Part I.B.2-3
(recounting the rational and holding of the EEBC and the ICJ).
19. See infra Part II.A.1-3 (arguing that lack of jurisdiction, claims of bias and
unfairness, and weak enforcement mechanisms weaken international courts' ability
to bind states to territorial decisions).
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that parties are more likely to adhere to a decision from a court under
the Permanent Court of Arbitration ("PCA") than the ICJ.2" This
section predicts that Ethiopia will not comply with the EEBC's
border verdict, with respect to Badme, because its agreement with
Eritrea, creating the EEBC, lacked qualities that make arbitration
courts more binding.2' Part III recommends measures judicial bodies
and mediators should take in the future to make territorial decisions
more binding.22 This comment concludes that involvement and
pressure from the international community, rather than reliance on
the goodwill of disputing countries, is the key to creating arbitration
agreements that bind countries to a judicial territorial decision.23
I. BACKGROUND
A. THE ETHIO-ERITREAN AND NIGERIA-CAMEROON BORDER
DISPUTES AND THEIR SUBMISSION TO THE RESPECTIVE COURTS
1. The Ethio-Eritrean War and the Algiers Peace Agreement
The area of what is now Eritrea came into existence in 1890, when
the Italians made their first colonial conquest in the Horn of Africa
20. See infra Part II.B (maintaining that decisions of arbitration courts more
readily bind the parties because the parties are more involved in the court's
decision-making process and therfore have little justification for opposing court's
rules, procedure, composition, and mandate).
21. See id. (arguing that every step in the process of creating the EEBC, from
the creation of the agreement, to the selection of the judges, to the EEBC's
interpretation of the agreement's provisions, drew complaints from Ethiopia). This
section also compares Ethiopia's situation with that of Nigeria, and explains why
Ethiopia is likely to follow Nigeria's lead in refusing to respect the tribunal's
ruling. Id.
22. See infra Part III (recommending that parties should litigate territorial
disputes in arbitration courts, that the arbitration agreement should include a strong
enforcement clause, and that both the agreement creating the arbitration court and
the decision of the court should avoid any ambiguity that may tint the parties'
expectations).
23. See infra text accompanying notes 237-246 (concluding that the two case
studies illustrate why courts should not simply rely on states' goodwill, but should
take precautionary measures to make their decisions more binding).
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and occupied the territory north of Ethiopia.2 4 Ethiopia evaded
colonial occupation by defeating the Italians in the 1896 Battle of
Adowa.25 After Italy's defeat, Ethiopia and Italy negotiated and
signed a series of agreements in 1900, 1902, and 1908 with regard to
the Ethiopian border with Eritrea.26 However, in 1935, Italy again
invaded Ethiopia and occupied it for four years before the British
freed both Ethiopia and Eritrea from Italian occupation at the end of
World War 11.27
In 1952, the United Nations ("U.N.") gave Eritrea to Ethiopia as a
protectorate, and Ethiopia added Eritrea as a province in 1962.28
Ethiopia's annexation of Eritrea set off a long and bloody civil war
that finally ended after a group of insurgent forces in Ethiopia united
with Eritrean insurgency factions and overcame the government of
the Ethiopian dictator Mengistu Hailemariam in 199 1.29 The new
Ethiopian government allowed Eritreans to determine whether to
remain a part of Ethiopia through a referendum in 1993, and the two
24. See PAUL HENZE, ERITREA'S WAR: CONFRONTATION, INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSE, OUTCOME, PROSPECTS 231-33 (2001) (explaining the history of
Eritrea's emergence as a state). The author notes that Eritrea came into existence as
a "geographic and political entity" after the Italians named their new conquered
territory Colonia Eritrea, the Red Sea Colony. Id. at 233.
25. See Derege Demissie, Note, Self-Determination Including Secession vs. The
Territorial Integrity of Nation-States: A Prima Facie Case for Secession, 20
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 165, 180 (1996) (recounting the history of
Ethiopia's battle with Italy); see also Minasse Haile, Legality of Secessions: the
Case of Eritrea, 8 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 479, 482-84 (1994) (describing how Italy
retained possession of Eritrea despite Ethiopia's defeat of Italy at the Battle of
Adowa).
26. See Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, supra note 15, para. 2.7
(cataloguing the series of agreements between Ethiopia and Italy).
27. See id. para. 2.8 (summarizing agreements between Ethiopia and Italy).
28. See MALCOLM N. SHAW, TITLE TO TERRITORY IN AFRICA 117-119, 212
(1986) (providing a detailed account into the U.N. Commission that recommended
the unification of Eritrea and Ethiopia and the resulting annexation of Eritrea by
Ethiopia in 1962). The Commission cited three reasons for its action including: the
sentiments of inhabitants of Eritrea, the interests of peace in East Africa, and rights
of claims of Ethiopia including Ethiopia's need for access to the sea. Id. at 118.
29. See Bereket Habte Selassie, Self-Determination in Principle and Practice:
the Ethiopian-Eritrean Experience, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 91, 104-11
(1997) (discussing different resistance groups within Ethiopia that fought for more
self-determination and eventually overthrew the Ethiopian dictator in 1991).
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countries separated amicably when 99.8% of Eritreans voted instead
for independence.3 °
However, relations between Ethiopia and Eritrea soon turned sour
as a result of disagreements concerning differing economic and
political directions.31 The extent of this bitterness shocked the world
when Eritrea moved its troops to claim Badme, an Ethiopian-held
town in the border between Ethiopia and Eritrea, and a full-scale war
on three fronts erupted between the two former allies.32 Concerted
efforts by the international community, including the United States
and the OAU, finally resulted in a peace accord on December 12,
2000.33
In the Agreement Between the Government of the Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia and the Government of the State of
Ethiopia ("Algiers Agreement"), Ethiopia and Eritrea created a court
of arbitration, the EEBC, and agreed to let the EEBC settle their
dispute.34 The Algiers Agreement also stated that the Commission
would consist of five members with a mandate to delimit and
demarcate the colonial treaty border based on pertinent colonial
30. See Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, supra note 15, para. 2.11
(explaining that in April 1993, over ninety-nine percent of voters in Eritrea favored
independence and that the United Nations Special Representative announced the
referendum process was free and fair).
31. See Khadiagala, supra note 12, at 39-43 (explaining the background to the
fighting and citing sources of bitter relations between the two countries even
before the border war erupted). Specifically, the article points out that differences
in economic and political policies, Ethiopia's refusal to permit Eritrea to use its
own currency to conduct trade between the two countries that led to the worsening
of relations between Ethiopia and Etreria. Id. at 43.
32. See Border a Geographer's Nightmare, BBC, May 12, 2001 (detailing how
a squabble over a small town grew into a full-scale war), at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/396571.stm (last visited Jan. 21, 2004); see also
Jane Perlez, U.S. Did Little to Deter Buildup as Ethiopia. and Eritrea Prepared for
War, N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 2000, at A9 (revealing that each country spent more
than one billion dollars each on weapons during the war).
33. See Eritreans and Ethiopians Sign Treaty to End Their Border War, N.Y.
TIMEs, Dec. 13, 2002, at A12 (reporting that the treaty, drafted by the OAU,
creates commissions to demarcate the 600-mile border, to exchange prisoners and
displaced people, and to hear war damage claims).
34. See generally Algiers Agreement, supra note 15 (reaffirming the cessation
of hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea and detailing the contents of the Algiers
Agreement).
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treaties and applicable international law.35 Moreover, it specified that
the EEBC would not have the power to make decisions ex aequo et
bono - according to what is just and proper.36 The Algiers
Agreement also stated that the Commission would base its rules of
procedure on the 1992 Permanent Court of Arbitration Optional
Rules for Arbitrating Disputes Between Two States.37 Another key
provision stated that decisions and rulings of the EEBC would be
final and binding, and that both countries would respect the
decision.38
2. Nigeria and Cameroon's Border Dispute and ICJ Compulsory
Jurisdiction
Whereas Ethiopia fought the control of a single European power,
the territory disputed by present-day Nigeria and Cameroon was
controlled by three colonial powers: Germany, France, and Great
Britain ("Britain").3 9 While in control, these countries nations entered
into a series of agreements dividing the territory amongst
themselves.4" Two sets of agreements are relevant to the Bakassi
35. See id. art. 1.2.11 (specifying the law the court would use to decide the
case).
36. See id. art. 4.2 (denying the EEBC the power to consider the equitable
doctrine, ex aequo et bono, in its decision).
37. See id. art. 4.11 (explaining that the Commission's rules of procedure shall
be based upon the Optional Rules); see also Permanent Court of Arbitration,
Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes Between Two States (Oct. 20, 1992)
[hereinafter Optional Rules] (setting out the optional rules of procedure for
interstate dispute settlement), at http://www.pca-
cpa.org/ENGLISH/BD/2stateeng.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2004).
38. See Algiers Agreement, supra note 15, art. 4.15 (confirming that both
parties agreed that the EEBC's decision would be binding).
39. See Land and Maritime Boundary Case, supra note 14, para. 33 (explaining
that agreements between Germany, France, and Great Britain at the end of the
nineteenth and the beginning of the in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth
centuries defined the boundaries of what are now Cameroon and Nigeria). Britain
primarily colonized Nigeria while Germany colonized Cameroon. Id. para. 30.
40. See id. para. 33 (observing that France and Great Britain signed the Franco-
British Convention of 1906 and the Franco-British Protocol of 1910 to delimit
possessions to the east of the Niger). Britain and Germany supplemented the
Anglo-German Agreement Respecting Boundaries in Africa signed November 15,
1893 with the Agreement of March 19, 1906, and redefined it by the Agreements
of March 11, 1913 and April 12, 1913. Id. Likewise, France and Germany signed
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dispute: (1) an agreement between Britain and the Kings and Chiefs
of Old Calabar; and (2) an agreement between Britain and
12Germany.
After World War I, however, Britain and France split Germany's
territory in West Africa into British Cameroon and French
Cameroon.43 Britain further divided British Cameroon into Northern
and Southern Cameroon for administrative purposes.' Nigeria and
French Cameroon gained independence in 1960.45 The following
year, British Northern Cameroon voted to become a part of Nigeria
while Southern Cameroon opted to become a part of French
Cameroon.
46
While Nigeria and Cameroon, as members of the OAU, agreed to
maintain colonial boundaries, they could not reach an agreement on
the demarcation of their border due to the vagueness of colonial era
treaties and the resulting exchange of territory between the three
agreements on March 15, 1894, April 9, 1908, and April 18, 1908, defining the
boundaries between French Congo and Cameroon. Id.
41. See Asisi Asobie, Conflict between Nigeria and Bakassi: Political Context
and Contending Principles, VANGUARD ONLINE EDITION, June 6, 2003 (relaying
that the people of the main settlements in the Bakassi peninsula owed allegiance to
the Obong of Calabar and that, through the 1884 treaty, Bakassi became a British
protectorate), at
http://news.biafranigeriaworld.com/archive/2003/un/06/0071.html (last visited
Jan. 21, 2004). Britain incorporated the Bakassi with the rest of Nigeria in 1914.
Id.
42. See Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon
and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nig.), 2002 I.C.J. 94, para. 37 (Oct. 10) (noting that the
March 11, 1913 and April 12, 1913 agreements between Germany and Nigeria
placed the Bakassi in German territory),
http://212.153.43.18/icjwww/idocket/icn!icnjudgment/icnijjudgment_20021010.P
DF (last visited Jan. 14, 2004).
43. See id. para. 34 (explaining that the Treaty of Versailles apportioned
German-held territory between France and Britain). France and Britain signed
separate agreements, in 1919, 1929, and 1930 to delimit their portions. Id.
44. See id. para. 35 (describing the 1946 Order in Council Providing for the
Administration of the'Nigeria Protectorate and Cameroon).
45. See id. (noting that French Cameroon gained independence on January 1,
1960, and that Nigeria gained independence on October 1, 1960).
46. See id. (detailing the British Government organized separate plebiscites in
Northern and Southern Cameroon in accordance with United Nations directives).
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colonial powers. 47 Although the two countries attempted to reach
bilateral border agreements, 48 border clashes nearly ignited a war
between the two sides over the Bakassi in 1981, and then again, in
1993 and 1994.49 On March 19, 1994, Cameroon claimed the Bakassi
and filed proceedings against Nigeria with the ICJ.5° Cameroon later
amended its claim, asking the Court to settle its entire territorial and
maritime boundary with Nigeria.51  Nigeria objected to the
jurisdiction of the Court and the admissibility of the case, but the ICJ
rejected this argument,52 finding jurisdiction to decide the case under
Article 36 of the ICJ statute.53
47. See Somerville, supra note 2 (commenting on the increasing number of
African conflicts caused by vague and poorly defined maps and colonial
agreements).
48. See Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon
and Nigeria, 2002 I.C.J. 94, para. 36 (discussing the Yaund& Declaration used to
carry out the demarcation of borders in stages and the Lake Chad Basin
Commission).
49. See Asobie, supra note 41 (describing the buildup of military conflict,
between Nigeria and Cameroon, over the Bakassi).
50. See Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and
Nigeria, 2002 I.C.J. at para. 1 (describing Cameroon's claim).
51. See id. paras. 3-5 (communicating that Cameroon asked that the Court
amend its original claim and settle the entire issue of the border between the two
countries). Nigeria did not object to the amendment. Id. para. 5.
52. See Case Concerning Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and
Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nig.), 1998 I.C.J. 275, 300 (June 11, 1998) (Preliminary
Objections) (holding that the ICJ has jurisdiction to judge the case on its merits
and that Cameroon had no obligation to continue negotiations with Nigeria before
filing its complaint to the ICJ), available at 1998 WL 1148893.
53. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 36, para. 2 (stating
instances when the ICJ would have compulsory jurisdiction to decide a case on its
merits), http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm#CHAPTER-II (last
visited Jan. 13, 2004). In the event of jurisdictional dispute, the ICJ has the ability
to determine whether it has jurisdiction. Id. art. 36, para.6.
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B. DIFFERENCE IN FORUM - COURTS OF ARBITRATION AND THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
1. Similarities and Differences Between the ICJ and the EEBC
The ICJ, formed in 1946, functions as the judicial organ of the
United Nations.54 Its mandate is to settle international disputes and to
give advisory opinions.55 In 1899, global leaders created the PCA to
provide an alternative international mechanism for settling inter-state
disputes.5 6 The EEBC was formed under the auspices of the PCA.57
Since the EEBC is a court of arbitration, two parties can come
before it only after mutual agreement.58 Each party may choose the
judges arbitrating the disagreement,5 9 the law and procedure that the
court will use, and the scope of the court's mandate.60 A court of
54. See Int'l Court of Justice, General Information - The Court at a Glance
[hereinafter General Information], (explaining the Court's relationship to the
United Nations), at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/igeneralinformation/icjgnnot.html (last visited Jan. 13, 2004).
55. See id. (explaining that the ICJ can give advisory opinions to authorized
international bodies and agencies).
56. See Permanent Court of Arbitration, General Information, (describing the
creation of the PCA at the first Hague Conference in 1899), at http://www.pca-
cpa.org/ENGLISH/GI/#History (last visited Jan. 13, 2004); see also Bette E.
Shifman, The Revitalization of the Permanent Court of Arbitration, 23 INT'L J.
LEGAL INFO. 284, 285 (1995) (providing background on the origins of the PCA).
57. See Algiers Agreement, supra note 15, art. 4(11) (basing the EEBC's rules on
the 1992 Permanent Court of Arbitration Optional Rules for Arbitrating Disputes
Between Two States).
58. See generally Carla S. Copeland, The Use of Arbitration to Settle
Territorial Disputes, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3073, 3074-3076 (1999) (summarizing
the qualities of arbitration courts).
59. See Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, supra note 15, para. 1.2
(noting that under the Algiers Agreement, Ethiopia and Eritrea each get to appoint
two judges and the Secretary General of the United Nations appoints the fifth
judge).
60. See Shifman, supra note 56, at 286-290 (summarizing innovations in the
PCA, such as its flexibility, modernizing procedural rules, and establishing a better
fund to pay for cases, that has made it more attractive to parties in dispute).
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arbitration, like the EEBC, may also hold hearings and deliberations
privately.
61
In contrast, the rules of the ICJ are more rigid.62 The United
Nations appoints judges to serve on the court for a certain term.63
Furthermore, hearings and deliberations of the ICJ are open to the
public.64 The ICJ also has limited enforcement mechanisms.65
However, unlike a court of arbitration, the ICJ may have compulsory
jurisdiction in certain cases,66 as was the case in Cameroon v.
Nigeria.67
In spite of these differences, the courts relied on similar laws to
reach their decisions on the Ethiopia and Eritrea border and the
Nigeria and Cameroon border.68 The fact that both Ethiopia and
Eritrea, like Nigeria and Cameroon, were party to the Cairo
Declaration restricted the applicable law that the EEBC could use to
61. See Copeland, supra note 58, at 3073 (noting that one advantage of
arbitration is the ability to proceed in secret).
62. See id. (highlighting that the ICJ's rigid structure makes it less preferable to
parties than arbitration).
63. See General Information, supra note 54 (indicating that fifteen judges,
voted in by the United Nations, make up the ICJ). However, if the Court does not
include a judge from the same country as a party to a case, that country may
appoint a person to sit as a judge ad hoc for the purpose of the case. Id.
64. Cf Copeland, supra note 58, at 3073 (pointing out that unlike the ICJ,
hearings of courts of arbitration may be held in private or secrecy).
65. See Susan W. Tiefenbrun, The Role of World Court in Settling
International Disputes: A Recent Assessment, 20 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
1, 24 (1997) (arguing that the structure of international adjudication in the ICJ
reinforces the failure of States to comply with the court's judgments).
66. See Bernard H. Oxman, ICJ Compulsory Jurisdiction - Effective Date of
Optional Clause Declarations - Existence of a Dispute - Effect of Absent Third
Party - Diplomatic Negotiation as a Precondition for Recourse to ICJ - Effect of
Negotiation Requirements of Law of the Sea Convention Where Jurisdiction is
Based on Optional Clause, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 751, 752-54 (1998) (explaining the
ICJ's rationale for permitting Cameroon to use the optional clause under Article
36, paragraph 2 of the statute of the ICJ to gain compulsory jurisdiction over
Nigeria).
67. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text (illustrating how Article 36
can provide the ICJ with compulsory jurisdiction).
68. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text (noting that both the ICJ and
the EEBC used applicable international law, colonial treaties, and the 1964 Cairo
Declaration to settle the dispute).
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reach its decision.69 Moreover, both the EEBC and the ICJ made their
decisions without considering the equitable doctrine of ex aequo et
bono, 7 0 which permits a court to base its decision on what is just and
proper. I'
2. The EEBC's Decision Concerning the Ethiopia-Eritrean Dispute
and its Rationale
Lacking the mandate to decide the case ex aequo et bono, the
Boundary Commission used the principle of uti possidetis,72 the
principle of adherence to boundaries existing immediately upon
independence, and applicable international law' to reach its
decision. 3 As a result, the EEBC focused on the 1900, 1902, and
1908 treaties between Ethiopia and Italy.7 4 The Commission
interpreted these treaties in accordance with their plain meaning and
in light of their context and objective.75 The Commission also applied
the doctrine of contemporaneity.76 In addition, the Commission took
69. See Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, supra note 15, para. 1.2
(setting out the laws and principles the EEBC used as a basis for its decision).
70. See Land and Maritime Boundary Case, supra note 14 (making no mention
of using ex aequo et bono to decide the case). But see Statute of the International
Court of Justice, supra note 53, art. 38, para. 2 (permitting the Court to use ex
aequoet bono if the parties agree).
71. See Russell Gabriel & Professor Louis B. Sohn, Equity in International
Law, 82 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 277, 278 (1988) (explaining that ex aequo et
bono is an international law and equity term meaning that the court should decide
the case according to what is just and proper).
72. See generally Steven R. Ratner, Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and
the Borders of New States, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 590, 591 (1996) (explaining that uti
possidetis is a doctrine that provides that newly independent states essentially
inherit the colonial administrative borders that they receive at the time of
independence).
73. See Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, supra note 15, para. 3.1-3.2
(conveying the source of law for the EEBC's determinations).
74. See id. para. 3.3 (noting that the Algiers Agreement specified the
significance of these three treaties).
75. See id. para. 3.4 (explaining that the Commission read the treaties to
determine what the signing parties actually intended or their "common will").
76. See id. para. 3.5 (conveying that the doctrine of contemporaneity means
that a treaty should be interpreted under the circumstances and background
prevailing when parties signed on to it and accounting for changes in names and
expressions).
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into account subsequent conduct such as prescription and
acquiescence.77 Evidence of prescription and acquiescence included
maps, activity on disputed territory showing the exercise of authority
(effectivit~s), diplomatic and similar exchanges, and admissions
before the EEBC.78  However, since the Algiers Agreement
specifically stated that the parties reaffirm the principle of respect for
the borders existing at independence, the EEBC took the conduct of
the parties into account only after the independence of Eritrea on
April 27, 1993. 79
The Commission used these principles to determine the border
sector by sector.80 Specifically, the Commission interpreted the 1902
Treaty to determine the path of the western border, near where
Badme is located."s However, differences in the Italian and Amharic
versions of the Treaty in reference to a river complicated the
Commission's interpretation of the 1902 Treaty.82 Analyzing
supporting evidence, the EEBC accepted Eritrea's contention that the
river named "Mateeb" in the Amharic version of the Treaty was
actually present-day Sittona and not Maiteb as Ethiopia contended.
8 3
77. See id. para. 3.14 (concluding that the Commission's mandate to use
relevant principles of international law includes the use of any rules of customary
international law pertaining to the case). The EEBC cited the reasoning from a
decision of the International Court of Justice in Kasikili/Sedudu Island
(Botswana/Namibia) in which the Court also took into consideration rules of
customary international law and reached the same conclusion. Id.
78. See Eritrea-Ethiopia Boudary Commission, supra note 15, ch. 3.16 (listing
examples of what the Commission considered evidence of subsequent relevant
conduct).
79. See Algiers Agreement, supra note 15, art. 4.1 (providing that the parties
would adhere to the principle of respect for the borders existing at independence).
80. See Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, supra note 15, para. 3.3,
(determining that the parties agreed that the 1900 Treaty covers the central sector,
the 1902 Treaty covers the western sector, and the 1908 Treaty deals with the
eastern sector).
81. See id. (organizing the EEBC's boundary ruling by sector according to the
relevant treaty).
82. See id. paras. 5.13-5.15 (pointing out that 1902 Treaty delineated a
boundary created by the point in the Setit River where the boundary follows
another river towards the confluence of the Mareb and Mai Ambessa).
83. See id. paras. 5.82-5.90 (indicating that the river could not be Maiteb
because the treaty explicitly intended to transfer the Cunama tribe to Eritrea). The
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Moreover, the EEBC rejected Ethiopia's evidence of subsequent
conduct demonstrating that it had exercised sovereignty over the
disputed land.84 Significantly, the Commission's decision did not
identify the town of Badme on any of the maps of its decision.85
3. The Basis for the JCJ's Ruling on the Nigeria-Cameroon Dispute
Like the EEBC, the ICJ relied on treaties and international law to
determine the boundary between Nigeria and Cameroon.86 In
particular, on the matter of the Bakassi Peninsula, the Court rejected
Nigeria's argument that Britain had no right to cede the Bakassi to
Germany in the Agreement of March 11, 1913, where the King and
Chief of Old Calabar previously signed a treaty with Britain on
September 10, 1884.11 The Court pointed out that the 1884 Treaty did
not establish an international protectorate.88 The Court also noted the
EEBC also discussed evidence showing that Ethiopia recognized Italy's possession
of land including the Cunama tribe. Id. paras. 5.44-5.8 1.
84. See id. paras. 5.94-5.96 (finding evidence that Ethiopia submitted of
policing activity in Badme Wereda from 1972-1973 and other items dating from
1991-1994 insufficient to consist of administration clear enough in location and
scope to displace Eritrea's title).
85. See Controversy Over Horn Border Ruling, BBC, Apr. 17, 2002
(highlighting that the EEBC's map of its boundary decision did not identify which
country was awarded possession of Badme, causing confusion and leading both
sides to claim possession of the town), at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1930613.stm (last visited Jan. 20, 2004).
86. See Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon
and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nig.), 2002 I.C.J. 94, para. 31 (Oct. 10) (remarking that
the dispute falls within historical framework and the treaties, diplomatic
exchanges, administrative instruments, maps, and various documents by colonial
powers),
http://212.153.43.18/icjwww/idocket/icn/icnjudgment/icn-ijudgment_2002 1010.P
DF (last visited Jan. 14, 2004).
87. See id. paras. 201-09 (discussing Nigeria's argument that Britain did not
have sovereignty over the Bakassi and could not, therefore, cede it to a third party).
Nigeria also argued that the international principle of nemo dat quod non habet
imposes a duty to protect the protectorate from external powers, not an ability to
cede the protectorate. Id.
88. See id. paras. 206-07 (explaining that Britain's choice of a protectorate
treaty did not incur an obligation to protect territory and to not turn it over to other
states).
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lack of evidence that the Kings and Chiefs of Old Calabar protested
the transfer of the Bakassi to Germany.89
Moreover, the Court decided in favor of Cameroon's argument
that Nigeria's vote in favor of General Assembly Resolution
1608(XV) was a sign of Nigeria's acceptance that the Bakassi
belonged to Cameroon. 90 In addition, the Court highlighted evidence
that Nigeria accepted, in 1970 and again in 1975, that Cameroon
maintained sovereignty over the Bakassi. 91 Finally, the Court rejected
Nigeria's claim of title on the basis of historical consolidation and
acquiescence. 92 In contrast to the approach used by the Eritrea-
Ethiopia Border Commission, the Court stated that where there is a
conflict between title and effectivit~s, the Court would give
preference to title. 93 Consequently, the Court held that Cameroon
retained sovereignty over the Bakassi. 94
89. See id. para. 208 (noting an absence of evidence of protest or action by the
Chiefs to transfer the Bakassi to Nigeria when Nigeria gained its independence in
1960). Thus, the Court did not have to rule on either side's arguments about
whether it could separately analyze the 1913 Treaty and declare parts of it invalid.
See id. para. 217.
90. See id. paras. 210-15 (agreeing that the map attached to the plebiscite
showed that the Bakassi Peninsula formed part of Cameroon and that Nigeria
failed to protest).
91. See Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon
and Nigeria, supra note 14, para. 214 (pointing out that documents such as the
Yaound6 Declaration of August 14, 1970 demonstrate Nigeria's acquiescence).
92. See id. paras. 218-24 (denying Nigeria's claim that large Nigerian
settlements in Bakassi gave rise to Nigerian ownership of the Bakassi). The Court
mentioned that civil war in Nigeria in the 1960s accounted for the large number of
Nigerian population in Bakassi, and noted evidence that Cameroon engaged in
activities on the Bakassi such as granting hydrocarbon licenses over the peninsula
and protesting Nigerian presence for the most part. Id.
93. See id. para. 223 (affirming the principle that title yields a stronger legal
claim than effectivit& from the ICJ's decision in Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v.
Republic of Mali) decided in 1986).
94. See id. para. 225 (summing up Cameroon's greater claim to the Bakassi).
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II. ANALYSIS
A. WEAKNESSES IN INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL BODIES' ABILITY TO
TRULY BIND COUNTRIES TO THEIR DECISIONS
1. Problems with Jurisdiction
A key issue that states raise to prevent being bound by a decision
of an international court is lack of jurisdiction. 95 Territorial decisions
are no exception.96 Not surprisingly, Nigeria quickly objected to the
ICJ's jurisdiction in Cameroon v. Nigeria.97 Similarly, once certain
that the EEBC had assigned Badme to Eritrea, Ethiopia protested that
the EEBC exceeded its jurisdiction.
8
The ICJ is especially prone to attacks of lack of jurisdiction." The
ICJ rules find jurisdiction before the ICJ when a state acquiesces to
the case brought before the court. l00 When the ICJ awarded the
95. See, e.g., Munya, supra note 2, at 162 (noting that "no state can be required
to recognize the jurisdiction of the Court," and that "states may revoke the
jurisdiction at any time or even refuse to appear before the Court").
96. See Gary L. Scott & Craig L. Carr, The ICJ and Compulsory Jurisdiction:
The Case for Closing the Clause, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 57, 63-64 (1987) (stressing
Thailand's objection to ICJ jurisdiction in the Case concerning the June 15, 1962
Temple of Preah Vihear Case between Cambodia and Thailand that concerned
territorial land). Thailand refused to turn the disputed land over even after the court
went against it. Id. The article also notes that France and China have revoked their
acceptance of the optional clause. Id. at 57.
97. See Land and Maritime Boundary Case, supra note 14, paras. 9, 12
(describing the procedural history of the case and Nigeria's objection to ICJ
jurisdiction).
98. See Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, Decision Regarding the
Request for Interpretation, Correction and Consultation Submitted by the Federal
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia on 13 May 2002 (addressing Ethiopia's objection
that the EEBC exceeded its jurisdiction), http://pca-
cpa.org/PDF/EEBC/Decision24June2002.pdf (last visited Jan. 21, 2004).
99. See Scott & Craig, supra note 96, at 58 (observing that most states prefer
not to accept a situation that might make them unwilling defendants before an
international court).
100. See Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 53, art. 36,
para. 2 (spelling out the different forms of acquiescence). For instance, compulsory
jurisdiction applies to questions concerning international law and disputes relating
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Bakassi to Cameroon, however, Nigeria called attention to the fact
that it had objected to the jurisdiction of the Court and had never
agreed to be bound by the Court's decision.'0 ' Likewise, the United
States, Thailand, and France are examples of countries that rejected
ICJ compulsory jurisdiction in the past."2
Questions of jurisdiction usually are less of an issue in arbitration
courts because the arbitration agreement spells out the arbitration
court's powers.0 3 Because arbitration courts are formed only with
the consent of both parties, states objecting to the jurisdiction of
arbitration courts, like the EEBC, have a weak case for objecting to
the court's jurisdiction unless the agreement leaves the question of
jurisdiction very vague. 104 Similarly, as Ethiopia had already agreed
to submit to the jurisdiction of the EEBC, it could only object to the
scope of the EEBC's decision. 5 As a result, Ethiopia has placed
more emphasis on the decision being "wrong and unjust."'0 6
to treaty interpretation. Id. Furthermore, the country must be a signatory of Article
36. Id. art. 36.5.
101. See Obasanjo Denies Bakassi Promise, BBC, Oct. 25, 2002 (reporting that
the Nigerian President stated that Nigeria was not bound to respect the ICJ ruling),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2361693.stm (last visited Jan. 20, 2004).
102. See supra notes 95-96 (examining countries who have objected to ICJ
compulsory jurisdiction after originally signing the optional clause).
103. See Copeland, supra note 58, at 3099 (mentioning that if the arbitration
court's powers are ill-defined, the party can actually claim its decision is null).
104. See id. at 3099-3 100 (citing the Dayton Accords as an example where the
parties could challenge the award as a nullity because the agreement did not
sufficiently define the arbitration court's jurisdiction or place limitations on its
powers). The author points out that if the court clearly exceeds the scope of its
jurisdiction, the parties may challenge the award as a nullity, a doctrine unique to
arbitration decisions. Id. at 3076.
105. See Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission: Determinations, Nov. 7, 2002,
paras. 4-10 [hereinafter Determinations] (addressing concerns with jurisdiction and
scope of powers of the EEBC), http://pca-
cpa.org/PDF/EEBC/Determinations071102.pdf (last visited Jan. 19, 2004).
106. See Border Ruling "Wrong and Unjust", Meles Says, UN OCHA IRIN,
May 27, 2003 [hereinafter Border Ruling Wrong] (quoting Ethiopian Prime
Minister Meles' statements that the EEBC decision was wrong and unjust and it
would be unfair to expect Ethiopia to comply with it),
http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b 16d2074285256830007fb33f/b343e0
66395d2569c 1256d330050b28d?OpenDocument (last visited Jan. 19, 2004).
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2. Claims ofInjustice and Unfairness Emanating from the Lack of
Power to Make Decisions Ex Aequo et Bono and from the Doctrine
of Uti Possidetis
Another justification countries provide for not being bound by
international territorial decisions is that the decision is unfair and
unjust. 107 Two sources for this inherent unfairness in international
territorial decisions are courts' lack of power to make decisions that
apply the doctrine of ex aequo et bono °8 and the principle of uti
possidetis.09
Denying courts the ability to decide a case ex aequo et bono is a
precaution intended to ensure that a court decides the issue purely on
the basis of the law.110 Theoretically, this minimizes the court's bias
and leaves less discretion to the court."' In reality, however, the
absence of considerations of overall fairness often leads to bitterness
and a sense of injustice." 2 For instance, although Ethiopia requested
the EEBC to strictly adhere to principles of law and to avoid
107. See Copeland, supra note 58, at 3100 (suggesting that controversy
concerning jurisdiction also often undermine parties' faith that the court would
issue a fair and unbiased decision).
108. See Gabriel & Sohn, supra note 71, at 280 (distinguishing between ex
aequo et bono and equity at law). The authors argue that ex aequo et bono is a
power that only the Court may exercise, if it has that power. Id. In contrast, equity
is a principle of law that parties may invoke at will. Id.
109. See Steven R. Ratner, Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis and the
Borders of New States, 90 AM. J. INT'L L. 590, 591 (1996) (asserting that uti
possidetis, in many cases, sacrifices injustice and unfairness for the sake of
maintaining the status quo). The article also argues that that uti possidetis in fact
leads to greater instability in newly created states. Id.
110. See Gabriel & Sohn, supra note 71, at 279-80 (discussing consequences of
using ex aequo et bono to settle border disputes). Cases where international bodies
use ex aequo et bono without mandate can lead to states refusing to comply with
decisions. Id. at 280.
111. See id. at 281 (discussing an arbitration case between the United States and
Mexico where the parties specifically asked the court to decided in the favor of one
country or the other, but ex aequo et bono resulted in a ruling neither side wanted).
112. See Thomas M. Franck & Dennis M. Sughrue, The International Role of
Equity-As-Fairness, 81 GEO. L.J. 563, 572-76 (1993) (contending that equity has
come to represent a set of principles designed to supplement the law and ensure
fairness between parties, especially in areas of scarce resources).
[19:633652
2004] MAKING STATES COMPLY WITH TERRITORIAL DECISIONS 653
compromise, Ethiopia later objected that the EEBC ruling was
",unjust."1 13
Arbitration courts that use the rules and procedures of the PCA are
created by agreements that include a clause denying courts the ability
to decide a case ex aequo et bono.'14 Yet, although both Ethiopia and
Eritrea agreed to limit the EEBC's power to decide the case
according to what is just and proper, after the EEBC issued its
decision, Ethiopia asked it to reconsider certain aspects of its
decision on the basis of fairness and justice. 15
The Statue of the ICJ, however, allows parties to mutually consent
to the ICJ's consideration of cases ex aequo et bono. 1 6 In Cameroon
v. Nigeria, the ICJ held that elements of unfairness and injustice
were not substantial enough to justify awarding the Bakassi to
Nigeria.117 Nigeria, however, challenged the fairness of the
decision. 118
113. Compare Ethiopian Foreign Minister Lobbies Border Commission,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Dec. 20, 2001 (quoting statements from the Ethiopian
Foreign Minister asking the arbitration commission to make its decision purely on
the basis of law and not on equitable considerations),
http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b 6d2074285256830007fb33f/587e84
4508984572c1256b280063db50?OpenDocument (last visited Jan. 19, 2004), with
Border Ruling Wrong, supra note 106 (quoting Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles'
statements that it would not be fair to expect Ethiopia to accept a decision that is
wrong and unjust).
114. See Optional Rules, supra note 37, art. 33.2 (stating that parties may give
the arbitration court power to decide a case ex aequo et bono).
115. See Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission: Decision Regarding the
"Request for Interpretation, Correction, and Consultation" Submitted by the
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia on 13 May 2002 (June 24 2002) para. 15
[hereinafter Interpretation, Correction and Consultation] (describing Ethiopia's
certain issues from the decision that Ethiopia asked the EEBC to reconsider),
http://pca-cpa.org/PDF/EEBC/Decision24June2002.pdf (last visited Jan 19, 2004).
The EEBC found Ethiopia's submission inadmissible and responded by asking
Ethiopia to revise its request with specific reference to applicable considerations of
international law. Id. paras. 17-18.
116. See Gabriel & Sohn, supra note 71, at 278 (pointing out that Article 38 (1)
requires both parties to empower the ICJ before it can decide the case ex aequo et
bono). But see Franck & Sughrue, supra note 112, at 570 (claiming that the ICJ has
ever decided a case ex aequo et bono).
117. See Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon
and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nig.), 2002 I.C.J. 94, paras. 218-19 (Oct. 10) (rejecting
Nigeria's equity arguments that Bakassi had a majority Nigerian presence and thus,
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The doctrine of uti possidetis heightens this sense of unfairness." 9
In Africa, uti possidetis, where countries respect boundaries as they
were at the time of independence, results in states abiding by
boundaries created by colonial powers.1 20 While uti possidetis may
prevent the fragmentation of states, it also perpetuates the status quo
and colonial hierarchy.' 2' This contributes to a sense of injustice and
paranoia that the destiny of African countries is still controlled by
colonial powers.
2
The Nigerian government expressed its distrust of the influence of
past colonial powers on the outcome of the ICJ's decision. 23 It
accused British, German, and French court officials at the ICJ of
bias, stating that, "[as] citizens of the colonial powers whose action
had come under scrutiny, [they] have acted as judges in their own




DF (last visited Jan. 14, 2004) (rejecting Nigeria's equity arguments that Bakassi
had a majority Nigerian presence and thus, belonged to Nigeria)
118. See Plaut, supra note 6 (quoting the statement of the Nigerian cabinet that
the ruling was a legal position contrary to all known laws and conventions).
119. See Ratner, supra note 109, at 591 (maintaining that uti possidetis creates
injustice by leaving large populations both unsatisfied with their status in new
states). But see TIYANJANA MALUWA, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN POST-COLONIAL
AFRICA 76 (Kluwer Law International ed. 1999) (arguing that uti possidetis was
not imposed on Africa but is one of few modem international law principles that
the collective vision of African countries helped to fashion).
120. See Mutua, supra note 3, at 1114 (arguing that continued application of uti
possidetis has not freed African people from the colonial legacy).
121. See id. at 1144-45 (arguing that African leaders agreed to maintain colonial
boundaries in part because of the post-colonial ruling elite's desire to maintain
status quo).
122. See id. at 1143-50 (suggesting that lack of moral considerations for
decisions based on uti possidetis doomed them for failure). Mutua discusses ethnic
conflict in countries such as Somalia, Ethiopia, the Democratic Republic of Congo,
and Kenya, and predicts more ethnic conflict until the international community
recognizes a better means of creating new nation states. Id.
123. See Plaut, supra note 6 (reporting that Nigeria quickly dismissed the ICJ
ruling after hearing the Court's decision).
124. Id.; see also Fred L. Morrison, The Future of International Adjudication,
75 MINN. L. REV. 827, 841-43 (1991) (studying voting practices and the
composition of judges in the ICJ). He finds that judge selection is very regional
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In contrast, Ethiopia's participation in selecting the law that the
EEBC would apply and the judges who would apply it, limited
Ethiopia's ability to protest the influence of Western powers.
25
Instead, Ethiopia focused on lamenting the unfairness of the decision
and urging the EEBC to reconsider its decision.126 In both the case of
Ethiopia and Nigeria, the EEBC and ICJ respectively ignored such
complaints, stated that their decisions were final and binding, and
refused to accept additional evidence or reconsider their decision.
21
3. Lack of Specificity in Arbitration Agreements
Vagueness and a lack of specificity in agreements are other
sources of weakness in courts' ability to bind states to territorial
decisions. 2s This applies to both: (1) vagueness in the colonial
agreements and treaties courts must interpret to reach their
decisions;129 and (2) agreements between the disputing parties to
create and be bound to the decision of an arbitration court. 3 °
and that judges' desire for re-election might influence them to remain consistent to
political line thinking of the relevant regional electorate block. Id.
125. See Algiers Agreement, supra note 15, arts. 5.2-5.3 (outlining the authority
of the parties to jointly appoint the arbiters and president of the Commission).
126. See Eritrean Badme Ruling Upheld, BBC, Mar. 31, 2003 (noting that
Ethiopia appealed maintaining that the Commission promised that the
demarcations could be refined),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/africa/2903229.stm (last visited January 26,
2004).
127. See Interpretation, Correction and Consultation, supra note 115, paras. 16-
18 (explaining that a request for interpretation of a decision may only be invoked
where a specific statement of the decision must be clarified in order for the parties
to properly apply it and does not include the possibility of appeal).
128. See Copeland, supra note 58, at 3100 (remarking that the Dayton Accord's
ambiguity concerning the actual issue actually before the Brcko arbitration tribunal
undermined the parties' confidence in the tribunal's ability to render a fair
decision). The Dayton Accord created an arbitral panel to resolve control over the
Brcko area. Id. at 3090.
129. See, e.g., Sommerville, supra note 2 (maintaining that vagueness and lack
of precision in border agreements between colonial powers has led to
irreconcilable differences between African countries).
130. See, e.g., Copeland, supra note 58, at 3099-3100 (examining the Dayton
Accord's vagueness in order to demonstrate problems with the ability of arbitration
to bind parties when the arbitration agreement poorly defines their powers).
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Vagueness in colonial agreements is especially relevant in African
territorial disputes."' Such vagueness gives great discretion and
powers of interpretation to the courts and can be a source for claims
accusing judges of bias and favoritism by the party receiving an
unfavorable decision. 132 This concern is often asserted in disputes
before the ICJ where the disputing parties are unable to pick the
judges. 3 3 For example, Nigeria accused ICJ judges of favoritism and
western bias after they awarded the Bakassi to Cameroon.'34
In addition, another source of conflict is vagueness in the actual
arbitration agreement between the parties.'35 This is true in cases
where an arbitration agreement defines the mandate and the rules of
procedure for the arbitration court too broadly.'36 General and
unspecific provisions trigger conflict over the scope of a court's
power. 137
131. See Munya, supra note 2, at 164-89 (citing several African cases before the
ICJ, such as the Guinea Bissau v. Senegal Case of July 1989, which arose because
of ambiguity in colonial agreements and the colonial experience).
132. See Plaut, supra note 6 (reporting the statement of the Nigerian cabinet
accusing the ICJ judges of bias and labeling their decision as "virtually null and
void").
133. See id. (quoting statements made by the Nigerian cabinet after the ICJ
issued its border ruling in Cameroon v. Nigeria). The statements accused the
judges of acting as citizens of the colonial powers and argued that they had based
their ruling on legal positions "contrary to that go against all known laws and
conventions." Id.
134. See Madu Onuorah et al., Bakassi: I'm Ready to Dialogue, Anytime,
Anywhere, Says Obasanjo, THE GUARDIAN (London), Oct. 30, 2002 (reporting the
Nigeria Labour Congress' statements that Britain acted arrogantly and
paternalistically and influenced the ICJ judges' decision),
http://news.biafranigeriaworld.com/archive/ngguardian/2002/oct/30/articleO6.html
(last visited Jan. 14, 2004). The article also reports that Britain denied any
involvement in ICJ decisions. Id.
135. See Copeland, supra note 58, at 3100 (emphasizing that ambiguity in the
Brcko arbitration agreement causes conflict over the tribunals powers and
purpose).
136. See id. at 3076 (warning that if an arbitration agreement does not clearly
define the court's powers, a party can challenge an arbitration decision in which it
thinks the court exceeds its powers).
137. See id. at 3099-3101 (examining the Dayton Accords as a flawed
agreement that lacked precision in defining the powers of the arbitration court).
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For instance, the Algiers Agreement simply stated that the EEBC's
decision was final and binding.'38 While case law generally
recognizes that final and binding decisions are not subject to appeal
or review, Ethiopia argued that the EEBC could reconsider its
decision.'39 The Algiers Agreement provides that the EEBC shall
determine its procedure based on the PCA's Optional Rules for
Arbitrating Disputes Between Two States; Articles 35 and 36 of
these rules discuss the procedure for the reinterpretation and
correction of awards in decisions. 4 ° However, the EEBC refused to
reconsider its decision, clarifying that the Articles did not permit the
EEBC to make substantive amendments to a decision, nor did they
permit one party to reargue their case.' 4' Following its conclusion,
the EEBC also issued its demarcation directions, maintaining that it
had no authority to vary the boundary line from its original
assessment, even if the demarcation ran through and divides a town
or village. 1
42
138. See Algiers Agreement, supra note 15, art. 4.14 (providing that each party
shall respect the EEBC's decision and the territorial integrity of the other party).
139. See Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, supra note 15, paras. 1-15
(summing up Ethiopia's appeal for reconsideration to the EEBC after the EEBC
issued its decision).
140. See Optional Rules, supra note 37, arts. 35-36 (explaining the procedure
through which states can ask the arbitration court to reinterpret and correct its
decisions).
141. See Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, supra note 15, paras. 16-17
(clarifying that states may request interpretation or corrections in case of confusion
or blatant errors, but they may not ask for another result); see also Eritrean Badme
Ruling Upheld, BBC, Mar. 31, 2003 (quoting the EEBC's ruling that it cannot
permit Ethiopia to unilaterally insist on adjustments to parts of the border decision
that it finds disadvantageous), at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2903229.stm
(last visited Jan. 14, 2004). The EEBC reiterated that the process of interpretation
does not involve appealing decisions or relitigating matters already settled by the
Court. Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, supra note 15, paras. 16-17.
142. See Determinations, supra note 105, para. 4 (citing Article 14.A from the
EEBC's demarcation directions in which the EEBC made clear that it had no
authority to vary the boundary from its original decision even if it meant that the
decision would separate towns and cities), http://pca-
cpa.org/PDF/EEBC/Determinations071102.pdf (last visited Jan. 14, 2004).
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Ethiopia reacted negatively to the EEBC's rulings. 14 3 Ethiopian
officials claimed that Ethiopia would never have approved of the
arbitration agreement had it known of the lack of flexibility in the
demarcation process. 44 Ethiopia's basis for questioning the EEBC's
decision was that the Algiers Agreement itself did not specify the
appeals process and the demarcation directions, nor did it detail the
instances where the EEBC could reconsider its decision. 145
The ICJ's decision in Nigeria v. Cameroon saw similar problems
because of the lack of concreteness in Nigeria's agreement with the
United Nations to respect the ICJ's ruling. 146 This uncertainty, which
existed even before the 1CJ issued its decision, contributed to the
ease with which Nigeria later rejected the decision. 147 Since the
parties never recorded Nigeria's commitment in writing, Nigeria
later denied ever having entered into an agreement to comply with
the ICJ's decision.
48
143. See, e.g., Zane, supra note 8 (observing Ethiopia's disappointment and
regret concerning the boundary decision).
144. Eritrea-Ethiopia: Border Ruling "Dangerous, " Says Tigray President,
IRIN, Aug. 6, 2003 (quoting the statement of the President of the regional
Ethiopian state of Tigray, who administered Badme as part of Tigray before the
war), http://eri24.com/news3469.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2004). The President
argued that Ethiopia initially approved of the boundary ruling only because it
believed that it could make border adjustments during the demarcation process. Id.
145. See Algiers Agreement, supra note 15 (lacking a provision adequately
clarifying the appeals process and the issue of interpretation).
146. See Nigerian Deal on Disputed Peninsula, BBC, Sept. 6, 2002 (discussing
statement from the U.N. that secret talks between the Presidents of Cameroon and
Nigeria led to both countries pledging to respect the impending ICJ decision),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2241155.stm (last visited Jan. 14, 2004).
147. See Obasanjo Denies Bakassi Promise, supra note 101 (reporting that in
spite of pressure from Britain, the Nigerian President denied ever pledging to
respect the ICJ's decision).
148. But see Nigeria "Does Not Reject" Bakassi Ruling, BBC, Nov. 13, 2002
(citing the Nigerian foreign minister's statement that Nigeria did not reject the
ruling, but simply highlighted its shortcomings and pitfalls), at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/africa/2468303.stm (last visited Jan. 14, 2004 ).
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4. Lack of Strong Consequences for Failing to Comply with
Decisions
Finally, a lack of strong consequences for violating the ruling of
an international court permits countries to disregard unfavorable
decisions.'49 In the case of the ICJ, Article 94 of the U.N. Charter
explains the repercussions for failing to abide by an ICJ decision. 50
However, the lack of explicit language in Article 94151 combined
with the Security Council's hesitance to get involved in territorial
disputes often leads to inaction. 152
As a regional hegemon 53 that enjoys good relations with
Permanent Security Council members, Nigeria could be assured that
the Security Council would not take measures to force it to comply
with the ruling.'54 This situation facilitated Nigeria's decision to
149. See John C. Guilds, III., "If It Quacks Like A Duck": Comparing ICJ
Chamber to International Arbitration for a Mechanism of Enforcement, 16 MD. J.
INT'L L. & TRADE 43, 69-71 (1992) (pointing to the Iran-U.S. case as an example
of where a strong and detailed enforcement mechanism led to a binding decision).
150. See U.N. CHARTER art. 94 (setting out how the UN will enforce ICJ
decisions), http://www.un.org/aboutun/charter/chaptl4.htm. (last visited Jan. 14,
2004).
151. See id. (warning that a party may protest to the Security Council if another
party refuses to comply). Article 94 only states that the Security Council may make
recommendations or take measures to enforce the decision. Id.
152. See Ibrahim J. Gassama, World Order In the Post-Cold War Era: The
Relevance and Role of the United Nations After Fifty Years, 20 BROOK. J. INT'L L.
255, 266-68 (1994) (observing that enforcement of ICJ rulings by the Security
Council is purely discretionary and that the U.N. machinery is slow to intervene
militarily). But see Lilly R. Sucharipa-Behrmann & Thomas M. Franck,
Preventitive Measures, 30 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 485, 502-03 (1998)
(examining the diplomatic "carrots and sticks" the U.N. has at its disposal to
prevent conflicts between states). Specifically, it discusses the options available to
U.N. sister organizations, such as the World Bank and IMF. Id.
153. See Binaifer Nowrojee, Joining Forces: United Nations and Regional
Peacekeeping-Lessons from Liberia, 8 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 129, 140-42 (1995)
(discussing Nigeria's leadership in molding Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) as a regional peace enforcing authority by emphasizing
Nigeria's role in ECOWAS' military intervention in Liberia in 1995).
154. See Vera Gowlland-Debbas, Security Council Enforcement Action and
Issues of State Responsibility, 43 INT'L & COMP L.Q. 55, 71 (1994) (discussing
how the Security Council is clearly a political organ and how political
considerations motivate decisions of Security Council members). The article also
identifies the potential for the Security Council's abuse of power. Id. at 73-74.
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reject the ruling and deny ever agreeing to be bound by it. 5' In fact,
instead of binding Nigeria to the decision, the United Nations pushed
Nigeria and Cameroon back to bilateral mediation. 56 Nigeria has
since backed away from its strong rejection of the ICJ ruling. 57 As a
result of the talks and mediation, Nigeria and Cameroon agreed to
implement parts of the border ruling and have exchanged villages
along their north-eastern border.'58 However, Nigeria and Cameroon
have yet to reach an agreement concerning the Bakassi.'59
In contrast, decisions of arbitration courts may be more binding.
60
Parties create arbitration courts with an enforcement clause that
details the consequences of disregarding a decision.' 61 Unfortunately,
in the case of the EEBC, Articles 4.14 and 4.15 of the Algiers
Agreement do not contain a strong enforcement clause. 62 These
155. See Obasanjo Denies Bakassi Promise, supra note 101 (reporting that
Nigerian President Obasanjo said that he would never agree to respect a judgment
without knowing which way it would go).
156. See Mission to Go to Bakassi, BBC, Dec. 3, 2002 (reporting that U.N.
Secretary-General Kofi Annan created a commission consisting of presidents of
both countries to discuss the border dispute),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/253388 l.stm (last visited Jan. 18, 2004).
157. See Nigeria 'Does Not Reject' Bakassi Ruling, BBC, Nov. 13, 2002 (stating
that although Nigeria had appeared to reject the ICJ ruling, the Nigerian Minister
of State for Foreign Affairs denied that Nigeria had rejected the ruling),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/africa/2468303.stm (last visited Jan. 19, 2004).
158. See Bilkisu Labarn Ohyoma, Nigeria Gives Village to Cameroon, BBC,
Dec. 9, 2003 (reporting that Nigeria/Cameroon Mixed Border Commission
facilitated an agreement that led Cameroon and Nigeria to swap villages consistent
with the lCJ ruling), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3303781.stm (last visited
Jan. 18, 2004).
159. See id. (explaining that Nigeria and Cameroon have not reached an
agreement on the Bakassi). Because of disagreement on the Bakassi, the two sides
agreed to deal with the border dispute sector by sector. Nigeria Stalls on Bakassi,
BBC, Aug. 7, 2003, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3131809.stm (last visited
Jan. 18, 2004).
160. See Guilds, supra note 149, at 43-44 (suggesting that the ability to choose
enforcement mechanisms is an attribute of an arbitration court that makes its
decisions more binding).
161. See, e.g., Algiers Agreement, supra note 15, art. 4, paras. 15-16 (declaring
that the EEBC's decision is binding and calling for the United Nations to facilitate
resolution of problems).
162. See id. (failing to include negative consequences for not complying with
the EEBC's ruling).
660 [19:633
2004] MAKING STATES COMPLY WITH TERRITORIAL DECISIONS 661
articles simply state that both countries agree to respect the decision
and that the United Nationsfacilitate the resolution of problems that
result from the transfer of territory. 63 There is no mention of
diplomatic consequences or punitive measures for failing to comply
with the decision. Moreover, while several guarantors, including the
United States, the U.N. Secretary-General, Nigeria, Algeria, and the
European Union, witnessed the signing of the Algiers Agreement,
there were no provisions in the Algiers Agreement specifying what
measures the guarantors must take against the party that refuses to
abide by the boundary decision.164
As a result of these weak enforcement mechanisms, both Nigeria
and Ethiopia were able to reject the outcome of the decisions.1
65
After the EEBC refused to reconsider its demarcation directions,
Ethiopia stated that the EEBC decision concerning Badme and parts
of the Central Sector were "totally illegal, unjust, and
irresponsible."' 66 Although agreements that create arbitration courts
can include tough enforcement clauses, the lack of such a clause in
this case bolstered Ethiopia's argument that they were not bound by
the EEBC's decision.
67
163. See id. (setting out steps for the U.N. involvement to encourage both parties
to comply with the EEBC's decision). Paragraph 16 asks the United Nations to
facilitate problems that arise due to the transfer of territory, but does not empower
the United Nations to take measures to ensure the parties' compliance with the
decision. Id.
164. Cf Jonah Fisher, Eritrea Acts Over Border Row, BBC, Nov. 20, 2003
(expressing Eritrea's frustration that none of the guarantors have taken concrete
steps to force Ethiopia to comply with the ruling), at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/hi/world/aftica/3224790.stm (last visited Jan. 18, 2004).
165. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text (explaining Nigeria's and
Ethiopia's reactions to the ICJ and the EEBC decisions respectively).
166. See Letter from Meles Zenawi, Prime Minister, Federal Democratic
Republic of Ethiopia, to UN Security Council (Sept. 27, 2003) (protesting the
EEBC's decision concerning Badme),
http://ethiomedia.com/press/meles un-letter_091903.html (last visited Jan. 18,
2004). Prime Minister Meles asked the U.N. Security Council to create an alternate
mechanism to settle contested parts of the decision. Id.
167. But cf Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Apr. 4, 1970, arts. 1-72,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 332-58 (1969) (setting out when state parties to treaties may
lawfully withdraw from a treaty), http://www.UN.org/law/ilc/texts/treaties.htm
(last visited Jan. 18, 2004). The Convention defines treaties as any agreement in
written form and governed by international law. Id. art. 2.1. Article 51 of the
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B. WHY DECISIONS OF ARBITRATION COURTS UNDER THE PCA
ARE MORE BINDING THAN TERRITORIAL DECISIONS OF THE ICJ
AND THE ETHIO-ERTREAN DISPUTE AS AN EXCEPTION
Decisions of arbitration courts are often more binding than those
of the ICJ.168 The primary reason for this is that countries are more
invested in the decision of an arbitration court. 169 Two disputing
parties choose the powers of the court, select the arbitrators, the law
the arbitrators would use, and how and who would enforce the
arbitration court's judgment.170
On the surface, therefore, the fact that the Eritrea-Ethiopia border
dispute took place in a court of arbitration rather than in the ICJ
suggests that Ethiopia is likely to comply with the EEBC's
decision.1 71 Ethiopia and Eritrea determined the law the court would
use, they chose the judges, they defined the court's mandate and
procedure, and they agreed that the decision would be final and
binding.
17 2
Convention permits parties to void treaties entered into through coercion and
Article 53 voids treaties that conflict with a peremptory norm of general
international law. Id. However, a fundamental change of circumstances may not
serve as grounds for the termination of a treaty if the treaty establishes a boundary.
Id. art. 62.2(a).
168. Cf Guilds, supra note 149, at 43-44 (indicating that ICJ chambers are
restructuring themselves to resemble arbitration courts in an effort to be more
binding).
169. See id. at 43 (identifying three basic concepts often attributed to
international arbitration that makes them more readily enforceable: parties' ability
to choose the panel, parties' power to decide on the applicable law, and the parties'
power to determine rules and procedure).
170. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text (describing attributes of
arbitration courts).
171. See supra notes 168-169 and accompanying text (suggesting that countries
who vest their efforts in creating a court and determining the rules of the court are
more likely to comply with the decision of the court than if they had no control
over the court and its decision-making process). But see Ethiopian Opposition
Wants Referendum On Disputed Border, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Dec. 31, 2001
(reporting that five Ethiopian opposition political parties joined to call for a
referendum before the EEBC decision could become binding), at
http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799bl 6d2074285256830007fb33f/ffaa363
3415ce8a8c 1256b33004af20f?OpenDocument (last visited Jan. 19, 2004).
172. See Algiers Agreement, supra note 15, art. 4 (determining the rules of
arbitration).
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However, Ethiopia voiced objections and reservations through
each step of the arbitration process from the creation of the Algiers
Agreement, to the selection of the arbitrators for the court, and the
arbitration court's application of the law from the Algiers
Agreement. 17 3 Although Ethiopia and Eritrea generally agreed to
submit their case to arbitration in June of 2000,174 it took six months
of diplomatic pressure and mediation before Ethiopia agreed to
provisions of an arbitration agreement.' 5
Immediately after Ethiopia and Eritrea signed the Algiers
Agreement, Ethiopia objected to the demarcations of U.N.
deployment being inconsistent with the agreement and to perceived
Eritrean violations of the agreement. 7 6 During the arbiter selection
173. See infra notes 174-176 and accompanying text (highlighting evidence that
Ethiopia was reluctant to settle its border dispute with Eritrea through arbitration).
174. See Ethiopia, Eritrea Sign Peace Deal to End Border War, REUTERS, June
18, 2000 (explaining that Ethiopia and Eritrea agreed to a ceasefire and the
deployment of peacekeepers),
http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799bl 6d2074285256830007fb33f/7f36edf
a99ac6269c12569030031eO5b?OpenDocument (last visited Jan. 19, 2004); see
also Africa: Briefing by US Envoy to the U.N. Richard Holbrooke on Africa, lRIN,
June 30, 2000 (commenting that Ethiopia was reluctant to commit to a ceasefire
because it was winning and wanted revenge on Eritrea for starting the war),
http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799bl 6d2074285256830007fb33f/ee838f
ddfa01722b8525690e00738c63?OpenDocument (last visited Jan. 19, 2004).
Holbrooke credited strong diplomatic efforts from the United States and the U.N.
for the ceasefire. Id.
175. See Paul Ejime, Ethiopia-Eritrea Conflict: Making Algiers Peace Accord
Work, PAN AFRICAN NEWS AGENCY, Dec. 17, 2000 (reflecting on the long path to
the Algiers Agreement),
http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799bl 6d2074285256830007fb33f/f53fab7
70e8a15fec12569b90043250e?OpenDocument (last visited Jan. 19, 2004). As a
testimony to the diplomatic pressure exerted on both sides to reach an agreement,
leaders including the U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, the U.N.
Secretary General Kofi Annan, the OAU Secretary General Salim Ahmed Salim,
President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria, and Algerian President Bouteflika
witnessed the signing of the Algiers Agreement. Id.
176. See Martin Plaut, Wranglings Over Horn Peace Deal, BBC, Jan. 2, 2001
(explaining differences between Ethiopia and Eritrea's understanding of troop
redeployment along their border), at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1097923.stm
(last visited Jan. 19, 2004). The Algiers Agreement stated that Ethiopia shall
submit redeployment plans for its troops and stipulated that a twenty-five
kilometers-wide buffer zone would be established along the border from these
redeployment points. Id. Eritrea insisted that redeployment should be negotiated
and not unilaterally determined by Ethiopia. Id.
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process, Ethiopia strenuously objected to Eritrea's choice of Mr. Jan
Paulsson as one of the arbitrators on the EEBC. 177 Eritrea eventually
had to choose a new arbitrator to replace Mr. Paulsson. 178 Ethiopia's
patience with the EEBC finally came to an end when the EEBC
rejected Ethiopia's request for reconsideration of the original
arbitration, 179 ruling that the EEBC ruling did not have the ability to
alter its decision without Eritrea's consent. 80
Thus, Ethiopia found itself in the same dilemma as Nigeria. 8'
Diplomatic pressures from the United States and the United Nations
177. See Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, supra note 15, at 1064, para.
1.6 (noting that Ethiopia lodged a challenge to Eritrea's selection of Mr. Paulsson
as an arbitrator); see also Copeland, supra note 58, at 3075 (explaining that the
selection of arbitrators is often a contentious part of the arbitration process).
178. See Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, supra note 15, paras. 1.10-
1.14 (explaining that since the arbitration agreement did not specify how the EEBC
would resolve a party's challenge of an arbitrator, the EEBC had to create its own
procedure). The EEBC decided that the unchallenged arbitrators would vote to
decide whether Eritrea should select a new arbitrator. Id. Following the arbitrators'
failure to reach a decision, Mr. Paulsson voluntarily stepped down and Eritrea
appointed a new judge in his place. Id. para. 1.14.
179. See Eritrea-Ethiopia Boundary Commission, Observations, paras. 1-13
(Mar. 21, 2003) (conveying the reasons why the EEBC refused to vary its original
decision), http://www.pca-cpa.org/PDF/Obs.EEBC.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 2004).
For instance, the Algiers agreement specifically stated that the decision was final,
made clear that the EEBC did not have the power to make its decision ex aequo et
bono, and called on the United Nations to resolve problems ensuing from the
boundary decision. Id. para. 9.
180. See Interview with Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, IRIN, Oct. 29, 2003
(quoting the Ethiopian Prime Minister's statement that Ethiopia had originally
approved of the April 2002 decision because it had assumed that the EEBC's map
coordinates for the decision "could be adjusted by checking the facts on the
ground"), http://www.irinnews.org/print.asp?ReportlD=37524 (last visited Jan 18,
2004); see also Border Ruling Wrong, supra note 106 (reporting Ethiopian Prime
Minister Meles' statements that it would not be fair to expect Ethiopia to accept a
decision that is wrong and unjust). But see Eritrean Badme Ruling Upheld, BBC,
Mar. 31, 2003 (referring to statements from Eritrea's Information Minister Ali
Abdu Ahmed praising the EEBC's decision), at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2903229.stm (last visited Jan. 18, 2004). The
Minister remarked that no party is allowed to change the ruling of the EEBC. Id.
181. See The Horn in Peril: Ethiopia Must Accept Arbitration Verdict, However
Painful, FINANCIAL TIMES, June 17, 2003, at 14 (comparing Ethiopia's decision on
whether or not to comply with the EEBC decision to Nigeria's decision on whether
to concede its claim to the Bakassi). The article states that if Ethiopia does not
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forced Ethiopia into an arbitration agreement, 8 2 just as diplomatic
pressures from the United Nations had compelled Nigeria to submit
to ICJ jurisdiction.I83 Additionally, both Nigeria and Ethiopia were in
stronger positions before the judicial rulings with substantially larger
populations, resources, and military might than their neighbors in
dispute. 184 In the end, both countries were unlikely to comply with
their respective court's decisions (with respect to Badme or the
Bakassi). 185 As a result, when Nigeria first decided to reject the ICJ
decision, it did so without facing any severe consequences. Ethiopia
was probably emboldened to act in a similar manner.
86
respect the arbitration decision, other countries with superior forces that obtain
unfavorable decisions will follow suit. Id.
182. See Abdelmalek Touati, Ethiopia and Eritrea Sign Peace Agreement,
REUTERS, Dec. 12, 2000 (stressing the diplomatic efforts that led to the Algiers
Agreement),
http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799bl 6d2074285256830007fb33f/81 fbca
049bdcf885cl2569b30060d23b?OpenDocument (last visited Jan. 18, 2004). In
particular, the article quotes statements by Secretary of State Madeline Albright
and United States special envoy Anthony Lake expressing the United States'
commitment to peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Id.
183. See Nigerian Deal on Disputed Peninsula, supra note 146 (citing a U.N.
statement that after U.N.-brokered talks between the Presidents of the two
countries, Cameroon and Nigeria had reached an agreement to respect the decision
of the ICJ).
184. See Ian Fisher, Ethiopia Wins Border War Against Eritrea, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 1, 1999, at A10 (describing a turning point in the border war when Ethiopia
launched a fierce World War I-style offensive, recaptured territory Ethiopia
controlled before the war and entered parts of Eritrea). After the defeat, Eritrea
agreed to a peace deal. Id.
185. See Ethiopia Says Border Decision "Most Dangerous, " REUTERS, July 4,
2003 (reporting that the Ethiopian President, in his report to the Ethiopian
Parliament, criticized the border decision as being a threat to regional security),
http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896fl 5dbc852567ae00530132/ae6567
86090d28c8c1256d590066740d?OpenDocument (last visited Jan. 18, 2004).
However, the President reiterated that Ethiopia is committed to resolving the
dispute through peaceful means. Id.; see also Nigeria Stalls on Bakassi, BBC, Aug.
7, 2003 (reporting that while Nigeria agreed to comply with certain aspects of the
ICJ ruling, it would not turn over the Bakassi for at least three years),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3131809.stm (last visited Jan. 18, 2004). Nigeria
ignored Cameroon's demand that Nigeria withdraw its troops from the Bakassi. Id.
186. Compare Nita Bhalla, Ethiopia Hails "Victory" Ruling, BBC, Apr. 18,
2002 (commenting on Ethiopia's initial reaction to the border ruling in April 2002;
Ethiopian officials believed that the ruling had awarded Badme to Ethiopia), with
Border Ruling Wrong, supra note 106 (conveying Ethiopia's reaction, after Nigeria
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Still, Ethiopia's compliance with the EEBC decision might have
been more likely if the Algiers Agreement had incorporated stronger
enforcement mechanisms.'87 Both Ethiopia and Eritrea depend
strongly on foreign aid and financing from the International
Monetary Fund ("IMF") and the World Bank.18 8 If the Algiers
Agreement made World Bank financing contingent upon compliance
with the ruling, Ethiopia's political figures would probably be less
vocal in opposing the EEBC ruling. 189 However, lacking such
consequences, Ethiopia, like Nigeria, will likely refuse to turn
Badme over when the process of demarcation begins. 90
Instead, Ethiopia has followed Nigeria's lead in trying to obtain a
more favorable outcome by renegotiating with the opposing
country.1 9' Just as Nigeria is holding bilateral talks with Cameroon
had already rebuffed its ICJ ruling in October 2002, to the EEBC ruling rejecting
Ethiopia's appeal). See generally Ethiopian Embassy, Ethiopia's Response to H.R.
2760, at 2 n.4 (Sept. 3, 2003) (claiming that it is not uncommon for countries to
object to certain aspects of international decisions, citing Nigeria v. Cameroon and
Nicaragua v. United States),
http://www.ethiopianembassy.org/ResponseHR2760.pdf (last visited Jan. 18,
2004).
187. See supra notes 162-164 and accompanying text (discussing the lack of
specific consequences for noncompliance with the EEBC's decision).
188. See World Bank, Ethiopia at a Glance, at 2 (revealing Ethiopia's external
debt and resource flows),
http://www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/aag/eth-aag.pdf (last visited Jan. 19,
2004). In 2001, Ethiopia made $441 million from exports but borrowed $419
million from the World Bank. Id.; see also World Bank, Eritrea at a Glance, at 2
(illustrating figures for Eritrea's revenues and borrowing),
http://www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/aag/eri-aag.pdf (last visited Jan. 19,
2004). Eritrea earned twenty million dollars from exports, but obtained seventy-
seven million dollars in aid from the World Bank that same year. Id.
189. See Carol Lancaster, Redesigning Foreign Aid, FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Sept./Oct. 2000, at 80 (arguing that the World Bank can effectively serve as the
primary channel for U.S. aid in order to preserve international peace and security).
190. See Eritrea-Ethiopia: "We Don't Want Another Cyprus, "Says U.N., IRIN,
July 31, 2003 (expressing fear that unless Eritrea and Ethiopia establish
communication and diplomatic relations, U.N. peacekeepers will be forced to
monitor the security zone just like peacekeepers in Cyprus),
http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896fl 5dbc852567ae00530132/55d98c
44d7067d91c1256d74004f402d?OpenDocument (last visited Jan. 18, 2004).
191. See Border Ruling Wrong, supra note 106 (quoting the Ethiopian Prime
Minister's statement that Ethiopia will attempt to improve the current impasse with
Eritrea through peaceful means).
[19:633666
2004] MAKING STATES COMPLY WITH TERRITORIAL DECISIONS 667
under the mediation of the United States, 9 2 Ethiopia criticized the
EEBC 193 and asked the U.N. Security Council for an alternative
mechanism to settle its border dispute with Eritrea.'94 Ethiopia also
offered to permit demarcation to proceed in uncontested areas, as
determined by the EEBC, in the Eastern Sector and parts of the
Central Sector. 195 Although the U.N. Security Council originally
resisted Ethiopia's call for a new body to decide on contested areas
of the border, 96 U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan recently
appointed Lloyd Axworthy to serve as a special U.N. envoy to
mediate between Ethiopia and Eritrea.' 97 However, unlike Cameroon,
Eritrea has resisted any efforts at mediation, 198 and rejected Lloyd
Axworthy's appointment. 19
192. See Cameroon-Nigeria Talks Inch Forward, BBC, Nov. 15, 2002
(describing the difficult and slow progress Nigeria and Cameroon were making
during their U.N.-mediated talks), at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2482347.stm
(last visited Jan. 18, 2004).
193. See Zenawi, supra note 166 (protesting that the EEBC decision concerning
Badme was "illegal, unjust, and irresponsible"); see also Ethiopian Permanent
Mission to the U.N., Letter of H.E. Mr. Seyoum Mesfin, Foreign Minister of the
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, to H.E. Mr. Kofi A. Annan, Secretary-
General of the United Nations (protesting inconsistencies in the EEBC decision
and stating that the EEBC has ceased to be a neutral body), at
http://www.un.int/ethiopia/eth03_pgs/mfa_1021_3.htm (last visited Jan. 18, 2004).
194. See Zenawi, supra note 166 (suggesting that the alternative mechanism be
composed of the guarantors and witnesses of the Algiers Agreement, and
representatives of the two parties).
195. See id. (suggesting that the demarcation begin without waiting for the
establishment of the alternative mechanism).
196. See U.N. Tells Ethiopia to Implement Border Ruling, IRIN, Oct. 3, 2003
(reporting that the U.N. Security Council reminded Ethiopia of its obligations
under the Algiers Agreement and called on Ethiopia to cooperate fully with the
EEBC),
http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/f303799b 16d2074285256830007fb33f/c20e85
8aabf880al c 1256db4005 lb44c?OpenDocument (last visited Jan. 18, 2004).
197. See UN Special Envoy Appointed to Help Stalled Process, IRIN, Dec. 29,
2003 (discussing the appointment of Axworthy to settle the deadlock between the
two countries),
http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896fl 5dbc852567ae00530132/4423de
9d2elb122c49256e0c000d15ed?OpenDocument (last visited Jan. 18, 2004).
198. See Eritrea Urges World to Help Resolve Its Crisis With Ethiopia, AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, Dec. 17, 2003 (referring to Eritrean Foreign Minister Ali
Abdella's statement that Eritrea refuses to talk with Ethiopia as long as Ethiopia
continues to reject the EEBC decision),
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III. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY SHOULD PUSH COUNTRIES
TO SUBMIT CONTENTIOUS TERRITORIAL DISPUTES TO
ARBITRATION COURTS RATHER THAN FACING ICJ JURISDICTION
Courts of arbitration possess a number of advantages over the ICJ
as a more binding forum for territorial disputes.20 0 Thus, in situations
where disputing parties are unable to resolve their dispute peacefully
and bilaterally and the parties have a great deal of animosity towards
each other, courts of arbitration are preferable to the ICJ as forums
for dispute resolution.20 1 This is especially true for territorial disputes
which embody sensitive issues of political and nationalistic
concern. 20 2 Countries that do not receive a favorable territorial ruling
are likely to resist the ruling unless they have personally invested in
and committed themselves to the decision, and unless they will face
severe consequences for defying the court's ruling. 3
http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896fl 5dbc852567ae00530132/42c737
a34cf9a61149256e00001e356d?OpenDocument (last visited Jan. 18, 2004).
199. See Eritrea Rejects U.N. Mediator On Border Dispute With Ethiopia,
AGENCE-FRANCE PRESSE, Jan. 2, 2004 (quoting the Eritrean Presidential Head of
Staff's statement that the concept of a special envoy is not acceptable to Eritrea
because it is an alternative dispute resolution mechanism to demarcate the border),
http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896fl 5dbc852567ae00530132/92add 1
c2e3d7 lbc9c 1256e0f004ef29a?OpenDocument (last visited Jan. 18, 2004).
200. See supra notes 168-170 and accompanying text (highlighting why
arbitration creates a more binding structure than the ICJ, including that parties
have more of an investment in the decision, and are more involved in the process).
201. See Copeland, supra note 58, at 3107 (arguing that states often see
arbitration as a preferable means of judicial settlement for sensitive territory
disputes, because it provides many of the benefits of a permanent court but more
flexible procedures).
202. But see id. at 3107-08 (advising against the practice of compelling
countries involved in contentious border disputes to submit to arbitration).
Copeland cites the Brcko arbitration, created by the Dayton Accords, as an
example of a failed settlement attempt. Id. at 3098-3103. The international
community forced the Federation and the Republika, the two constituent elements
of the single state of Bosnia and Hercegovina, into arbitration following the
Dayton accords. Id. at 3088.
203. See Ian Brownlie & Surya Prakash Sinha, The Peaceful Settlement of
International Disputes in Practice, 7 PACE INT'L L. REV. 257, 267 (1995)
(observing that governments that agree to terms of arbitration are not likely to
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Consequently, in volatile border disputes, the international
community should push parties to create and submit their dispute to
courts of arbitration rather than the ICJ.2°4 While many recognize the
ICJ as the world's highest court, built-in constraints make it less able
to change itself.205 Additionally, bureaucratic checks make it less
able to adapt itself. For example, a majority of the United Nations'
member states, and then the Security Council, would have to approve
any change to the U.N. Charter that proposed more severe
consequences for failure to comply with an ICJ ruling. 6 Given that
some Security Council members are suspicious of any encroachment
of the ICJ on state sovereignty, such a change is unlikely to occur.20 7
Moreover, the lack of strict adherence to precedent can lead to
conflicting ICJ decisions, giving a country extra ammunition to
contest a decision.20 8 It is for these reasons that the international
community should push parties involved in volatile border disputes
to submit their dispute to courts of arbitration, rather than to the
ICJ.
209
subsequently attack the decision of the court of arbitration they themselves
designed to resolve a conflict).
204. See Copeland, supra note 58, at 3103-06 (arguing that judicial settlement
through arbitration is the most feasible type of settlement of contentious issues as
long as outside forces do not dictate terms of the arbitration agreement).
205. See Munya, supra note 2, at 160-62 (discussing the structural challenges
that have led countries to criticize the ICJ's ability to adjudicate contentious
disputes).
206. See U.N. CHARTER art. 108 (providing that amendments to the U.N.
Charter can only take effect if two-thirds of the General Assembly and all
permanent members of the Security Council approve them).
207. See Kurt Taylor Gaubatz & Matthew MacArthur, How International is
"International" Law, 22 MICH. J. INT'L L. 239, 241 (2001) (suggesting that the
Western world enjoys a monopoly over legal practice that influence of
international legal principles and constrains the effectiveness of international law).
208. See H. Vern Clemons, Comment, The Ethos of the International Court of
Justice is Dependent Upon the Statutory Authority Attributed to Its Rhetoric: A
Metadiscourse, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1479, 1506-10 (1997) (arguing that the ICJ
must recognize precedent and implement the doctrine of stare decisis in order to
gain international credibility and establish a stable international judicial order).
209. See Copeland, supra note 58, at 3104-07 (arguing that judicial settlement
through arbitration is the most feasible type of settlement of contentious issues as
long as the parties themselves, and not outside forces, dictate the terms of the
arbitration agreement).
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While the ICJ is not perfect, neither are arbitration courts.21 ° As
Ethiopia's reaction to the EEBC decision demonstrates, weak
enforcement clauses and broad rules and procedures can make states
reluctant to comply with a court of arbitration's rulings.21 1 Therefore,
the international community should be vigilant in promoting
arbitration agreements that reinforce courts' ability to bind the
parties to rulings. 212 The Untied Nations, regional international
organizations, and their wealthier members host, mediate, and
finance the creation of agreements to establish arbitration courts and
commissions. These groups must stress to disputing states that the
arbitration agreement must not contain ambiguous clauses and weak
enforcement clauses.
2 13
B. PARTIES CREATING ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS SHOULD
CLARIFY AND INCORPORATE CRITICAL RULES OF PROCEDURE IN
THE ARBITRATION AGREEMENT ITSELF
Articles in an arbitration agreement that are too general can
corrode parties' perception of the validity of a court's ruling.2"4 Thus,
the arbitration agreement should specify critical rules of procedure.2 5
In particular, in a contentious border dispute, the arbitration
agreement should spell out the provisions relating to the appeals
210. See id. at 3098-3 100 (singling out the failure of the Brcko arbitration , and
explaining that it failed primarily because control of the disputed territory
remained the subject of a continuing political dispute at the time the parties
submitted to arbitration).
211. See supra Part II.A. 1-3 (illustrating weaknesses in the Algiers Agreement
that facilitated Ethiopia's lack of compliance with the EEBC decision)..
212. See Optional Rules, supra note 37, arts. 31-32 (providing that the
arbitration court's determinations regarding rules and procedures are, in the
absence of a majority of arbitrators, subject to revision by the arbitration tribunal
and stating that "[t]he award shall be. .. final and binding on the parties.").
213. See Africa: Briefing By U.S. Envoy to the U.N. Richard Holbrooke, supra
note 174 (explaining that the United States and Japan bear the brunt of the expense
of maintaining peace between Ethiopia and Eritrea).
214. See supra Part II.A.3 (positing that a lack of specificity in arbitration
agreements can weaken an arbitration court's ability to bind the parties to its
decisions).
215. See supra notes 135-137 and accompanying text (providing evidence that
general provisions that leave too much discretion to the arbitration court can lead
to conflict between the parties):
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process and the court's power to reconsider its prior decision.1 6 For
instance, the Algiers Agreement should have been more precise
about the appeals process, and should have clarified those limited
circumstances in which the EEBC could reinterpret its decisions.217
Moreover, the EEBC should have issued its demarcation
directions before it reached a decision.218 Since both sides shared an
incentive to guarantee the finality and binding capacity of the EEBC
ruling before the EEBC issued its decision, it is likely that Ethiopia
would not have objected to that portion of the demarcation directions
that stated that the boundary could not be varied to account for
current inhabitants and existing towns and cities.2 9 Thus, if the
EEBC issued its Demarcation Direction before it issued its border
decision, Ethiopia would have had less justification to protest.
220
One can argue that requiring specificity makes it less likely that
countries would agree on an arbitration agreement.221 However,
countries' desire to ensure that their opponent complies with the
court's decision counters their reluctance to submit to binding
216. See Copeland, supra note 58, at 3099-3102 (suggesting that vague and
general provisions allow courts of arbitration to disregard legal, factual, and
equitable arguments in favor of political considerations, leading to accusations of
bias and bringing the court's neutrality into question).
217. See Algiers Agreement, supra note 15 (failing to include a provision
governing the appeals process).
218. See Determinations, supra note 105, at pmbl. (revealing that, in its
Demarcation Directions of July 21, the EEBC determined that it would not vary
the boundary line in order to prevent towns and cities from being separated).
Ethiopia objected to this provision of the Demarcation Direction. Id. para. 3.
219. See Ethiopian Foreign Minister Lobbies Border Commission, supra note
113 (quoting statements from the Ethiopian Foreign Minister in which he asked the
arbitration commission to make its decision purely on the basis of law and not
equitable measures). The Foreign Minister also argued that the EEBC should not
base its decision on political considerations and compromise. Id.
220. See id. (suggesting that before the EEBC issued its decision, Ethiopia was
confident that it would obtain a favorable ruling).
221. See Morrison, supra note 124, at 838 (intimating the difficulties associated
with according both parties to the adjudication process the ability to choose their
own specific terms). The author explains that the ease with which parties could
block adjudication in the context of GATT dispute settlement compensated for
these difficulties. Id.
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arbitration.222 Since both sides often believe they have the better case,
the desire to bind the other party is likely to be of primary concern.
In short, areas that may become sources of conflict later on should be
worked out in the arbitration agreement early in the process so that
neither party has an excuse for complaint after the arbitration court
issues its decision. 4
C. PARTIES SHOULD INCLUDE STRONGER ENFORCEMENT CLAUSES
IN ARBITRATION AGREEMENTS
Stronger enforcement clauses would also tend to make states more
likely to abide by the court's decisions. 225 A clause threatening
monetary damages or loss of institutional membership or voting
rights in international organizations is one example.226 In addition, an
enforcement clause can make membership in the IMF contingent
upon compliance with the arbitration court's decision. 227 Even if such
222. See Touati, supra note 182 (quoting statements from Ethiopia and Eritrea's
leaders pledging to respect the Algiers Agreement and urging the other side to do
the same).
223. See Ethiopia: Official Condemns Any Refusal to Accept Border Ruling,
IRIN, Apr. 2, 2002 (expressing Ethiopia's belief in the superiority of its own
position eleven days before the EEBC declared its decision), at
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportlD=27046&SelectRegion=Homof Afr
ica&SelectCountry=ETHIOPIA (last visited Jan. 21, 2004). Ethiopia feared that
Eritrea would refuse to abide by the EEBC ruling. Id.
224. See Copeland, supra note 58, at 3080 (crediting specific rules and
procedures and well-defined issues for the success of the Rann of Kutch
Arbitration concerning a border dispute between India and Pakistan).
225. See supra Part II.A.4 (pointing to the outcomes of the Nigeria-Cameroon
case and the Ethiopia-Eritrea arbitration, both of which threatened only weak
sanctions for non-compliance, in order to illustrate that the lack of a strong
enforcement clause makes it easier for countries to refuse to comply with an
arbitration decision).
226. See Andrea Kupfer Schneider, Getting Along: the Evolution of Dispute
Resolution Regimes in International Trade Organizations, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L.
697, 721-23 (1999) (discussing the range of options, including the imposition of
damages, that the WTO has in enforcing compliance with dispute settlement
proceedings).
227. See supra note 188 (illustrating Ethiopia and Eritrea's dependence on
World Bank aid and lending); see also World Bank, General Information About
Membership (finding that since countries have to be members of the IMF in order
to qualify for World Bank funding, developing countries feel great pressure to
comply with decisions of arbitration courts when IMF membership is at stake), at
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clauses are contingent on the approval of the IMF or World Bank,
whose benefit is denied to non-complying parties, 228 it will certainly
make the country less reluctant to comply with a binding
judgment.229 Moreover, the clause should also contain a provision
denying future grants for funding the cost of litigation23 ° before the
arbitration court from the mediating party to the non-complying
party.23' However, such a measure would only be effective for
developing countries that are dependant on foreign aid. 32
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK
:20040908-menuPK:250996-pagePK:43912-piPK:44037-theSitePK:29708,00.ht
ml (last visited Jan. 21, 2004).
228. See Articles of Agreement of the International Development Association,
Jan. 26, 1960, art. V, sec. 6, 11 U.S.T. 2284, 2289, 439 U.N.T.S. 249, 255
(prohibiting officers of the Agency from considering political factors when
deciding whether to fund projects in a certain country). The International
Development Agency is the division of the World Bank responsible for funding
projects in less developed countries. Id. art. I. However, the Articles of Agreement
do not expressly define "political consideration." Id. art. V. In practice, World
Bank executives distinguish between issues that predominately affect economic
indicators and those that are primarily political in nature. See Professor Daniel
Bradlow, Class Lecture at the Washington College of Law, International Finance
and Development Law Class (Sept. I1, 2003). World Bank officers should only
consider issues that substantially affect economic indicators when deciding on
whether to finance a project. Id. One can argue, however, that the World Bank can
consider the parties' refusal to comply with international judicial decisions as an
economic factor because of the devastating economic consequences of the
continuance of armed conflict. See Perlez, supra note 32 (estimating that Ethiopia
and Eritrea spent more than one billion dollars on weapons, money that they could
have spent on development).
229. See Sucharipa-Behrmann, supra note 152, at 502-503 (discussing
diplomatic options available to the World Bank and IMF).
230. See Progress Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea,
U.N. SCOR, at 4, U.N. Doc. S/2003/858 (2003) (estimating that logistic and
administrative costs of the EEBC and border demarcation would cost $14.5
million), http://ods-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/LJNDOC/GEN/NO3/484/71/PDF/N0348471 .pdf?OpenElement (last
visited Jan. 22, 2004).
231. See Eritrea-Ethiopia: Congressmen Seek to Limit US Aid If Border Ruling
Not Heeded, IRIN, Aug. 12, 2003 (discussing four Congressmen's efforts to get
Congress to pass a bill sponsored by Democrat Tom Lantos, entitled the
Resolution of the Ethiopia-Eritrea Border Dispute Act of 2003, that would restrict
development and military aid to Ethiopia and Eritrea until they resolve their border
dispute),
http.//www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID= 35918&SelectRegion=HornofAf
rica&SelectCountry=ERITREA-ETHIOPIA (last visited Jan.. 19, 2004). The
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
One can argue that Ethiopia would not have complied with any
decision that would have required it to relinquish Badme to
Eritrea. 33 But if a truly binding clause had imposed a severe penalty,
such as the loss of Ethiopia's status as host to the Africa Union,
Ethiopia likely would not have obstructed the EEBC's ruling.3
Again, while a strong enforcement clause may make some countries
reluctant to agree to arbitration, other countries may be willing to
insert such a clause to ensure that the court's decision truly binds the
other party.235 The PCA should encourage the use of such clauses in
its Optional Rules of Procedure for Arbitration Between Disputing
States.236
Congressmen referred the bill to the International Relations Committee. Id. But see
Ethiopian Embassy, supra note 186, at 4 (protesting that Ethiopia is fully
cooperating with the EEBC and that states involved in arbitration have to request
modifications when errors appear in the rulings).
232. See Nicholas P. Van Deven, Taking One for the Team: Principle of Treaty
Adherence as a Social Imperative for Preserving Globalization and International
Legal Legitimacy as Upheld in Re World War II Era Japanese Forced Labor
Litigation, 46 ST. Louis U. L.J. 1091, 1117 n.172 (2002) (addressing arguments
that the international legal system is flawed because superpowers escape sanctions
for violating international law).
233. See Martin Plaut, Tense Horn Awaits Border Decision, BBC, Apr. 12, 2002
(reporting that although the national government of Ethiopia stated its willingness
to commit to the upcoming decision, Ethiopian officials from the Tigray province,
that claims Badme, were wary of any decision that would lead to the loss of
Badme), at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1923737.stm (last visited Jan. 19,
2004).
234. See Letter from Eritrea to the President of the U.N. Security Council, U.N.
SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/2003/305 .(2003) (urging the Security Council to warn
Ethiopia to comply with EEBC decision or face serious consequences),
http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/0/69ed158618d63140cl 256cedOO3ebc7c?Ope
nDocument (last visited Jan. 22, 2004). Eritrea suggests that Ethiopia's non-
compliance constitutes a breach of international peace and security that is subject
to Chapter VII enforcement. Id.
235. See supra notes 2i9-220 and accompanying text (illustrating Ethiopia and
Eritrea's original willingness to abide by the EEBC decision and fear that the other
party would fail to comply).
236. See Shifman, supra note 56, at 286-89 (describing how the PCA has the
ability to adopt and modernize its own rules and procedures).
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CONCLUSION
In mediating volatile border disputes, the international community
should refer the disputing countries to arbitration courts, under the
PCA, rather than to the ICJ.237 There is a strong need, however, for
the international community to be just as involved in encouraging
compliance with decisions of international judicial bodies as they are
mediating the creation of agreements. 238 The guarantors of such
agreements should also verify that such agreements are not
ambiguous and have effective enforcement mechanisms.3 9 The
government in power will be hesitant to comply with an unfavorable
border decision and risk unifying opposition parties and losing its
political support unless it faces strong enforcement measures and
public consequences for noncompliance.24 °
Due to international pressure on Ethiopia and Eritrea to resume
dialogue and to reach an amicable settlement, Eritrea will likely
eventually agree to hold talks with Ethiopia.2 41 As a result, like the
237. See supra Part III.A.1 (detailing the benefits of arbitration to judicial
settlement in the ICJ for contentious border disputes).
238. See Ejime, supra note 175 (warning that the international community has a
duty to continue to invest diplomatic, logistic and financial support to the peace
process until Ethiopia and Eritrea reach an enduring and peaceful conclusion to
their dispute).
239. See supra Part III (recommending that arbitration agreements specifically
define contentious issues such as the appeals process and include more severe
enforcement provisions to increase the likelihood of a country's compliance with a
border decision).
240. See Ethiopia: New Opposition Coalition Seeks "Renegotiation" of Border
Ruling, IRIN, Aug. 12, 2003 (reporting that fifteen Ethiopian political parties
formed a coalition to contest the 2005 general elections under a central promise to
renegotiate the EEBC border ruling),
http://www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/s/3AB2E6F51BC811E5C 1256D8000428655
(last visited Jan. 19, 2004).
241. See S.C. Res. 1507, U.N. SCOR, 4822nd mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1507
(2003) (reaffirming the need for dialogue between Ethiopia and Eritrea and calling
on both parties to normalize relations), http://ods-dds-
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GENN03/498/87/PDFN0349887.pd? OpenElement (last
visited Jan. 22, 2004); see also Progress Report of the Secretary-General on
Ethiopia and Eritrea, U.N. SCOR, at 8, U.N. Doc. S/2003/1186 (2003) (expressing
Secretary-General Kofi Annan's observation that "a crucial aspect of a well-
functioning and mutually beneficial relationship between two neighboring states is
an open channel of communication at all levels"), http://ods-dds-
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situation with Nigeria and Cameroon, demarcation of the border
between Ethiopia and Eritrea will proceed sector by sector.242
However, Badme and other disputed areas in the Central Sector will
probably remain unresolved indefinitely.243 Such unresolved conflicts
pose the risk of encouraging disputing countries to interfere in the
other country's domestic politics. 24  Moreover, it presents the
possibility of the resumption of war.245 In short, arbitration
agreements must be clear, unambiguous, and contain severe
ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N03/660/87/PDF/N0366087.pdf.?OpenElement (last
visited Jan. 22, 2004). Ethiopia has also adopted a pro-dialogue stance. See African
Union to Push for Lasting Peace Between Ethiopia, Eritrea, AGENCE FRANCE-
PRESSE, Dec. 16, 2003,
www.reliefweb.int/w/rwb.nsf/6686f45896fl 5dbc852567ae00530132/9ffee58fadbb
885ec1256dfe004fb1 19?OpenDocument (last visited Jan. 27, 2004).
242. See Letter from Meles Zenawi, supra note 166 (emphasizing Ethiopia's
willingness to go ahead with border demarcation and territorial transfer for parts of
the EEBC decision that it does not dispute).
243. See Interview with Prime Minister Meles Zenawi, supra note 180
(presenting Ethiopia's position that the EEBC decision to impart Badme to Eritrea
was illegal and unjust); see also Eritrea: Interview with Recalled A U Ambassador
Salih Omer, IRIN, Nov. 21, 2003 (insisting border decision is legitimate and that
Badme is Eritrean territory),
http://www.irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=38027&SelectRegion=Hornof Afr
ica&SelectCountry=ERITREA (last visited Jan. 19, 2004). Ambassador Salih
Omer explained that Eritrea had recalled him from the African Union to protest the
African Union's failure to act against Ethiopia's non-compliance. Id.
244. See Smarting Over Bakassi, Nigeria to Fund Cameroon "Dissidents"
Paper, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, May 21, 2003 (citing the contents of a Cameroon
bi-weekly newspaper, AURORE PLUS, that accused the Nigerian government of
political involvement in Cameroonian domestic affairs in order to maintain
possession of Bakassi); see also Eritrea 'Region's Trouble-Maker', BBC, Dec. 29,
2003 (confirming that Ethiopia, Sudan, and Yemen established a regional alliance
to combat terrorism and accused Eritrea of interfering in domestic politics and
contributing to regional instability),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/world/africa/3353313.stm (last visited Jan. 19, 2004).
245. See supra notes 173-175 (discussing that Eritrea and Ethiopia were
reluctant to settle the border dispute). But see Eritrea, Ethiopia Agree On Local
Military Border Commissions: UN, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, Dec. 18, 2003
(reporting that senior military officials from Ethiopia and Eritrea met, under the
mediation of the U.N. Mission in Eritrea-Ethiopia, and agreed to form a local
military border commission to prevent border incidents from inciting major
battles).
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enforcement mechanisms to insure compliance and to avoid
prolonged border disputes.246
246. See supra Part III (advocating explicit arbitration agreements that spell out
severe consequences for parties who refuse to be bound by the border ruling).
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